G.R. No. L-1236, May 26, 1948
FACTS: Marcelo E. Inton, Fe Severa, E. Inton, Antonion E. Inton and Olimpia E. Inton, brothers and sisters, were the owners in equal and undivided shares of a parcel of land having an area of 15,167 square meters and situated in Samal, Bataan. On May 10, 1936, Macelo E. Inton, Fe Severa E. Inton, both of age, and their mother Fileda Enrile, the latter acting "in representation" of Antonio E. Inton and Olimpia E. Inton, then under age, sold that land to Alejandro Malibiran, husband and wife with a condition that contract is subject to ratification by the minors Antonio and Olimpia Inton upon reaching the age of majority.
By virtue of the sale, the purchaser took possession of the property and held it until 1942, when they died and the land, in the extrajudicial partition among their heirs, passed into the hands of Daniel Quintana, Alejandro Quintana's brother and the principal or virtually the sole defendant in this case.
Sometime in 1944, when Antonio Inton and Olimpia Inton had attained the age of majority, Daniel Quintana, so it is alleged, attempted to have them as well as their brother Marcelo and their sister Fe Sevarra execute an absolute deed of conveyance. The four brother and sisters not only refused but commended the instant suit.
ISSUES:
1. W/N minors are bound by a contract of sale entered into by their mother and siblings who are of legal age between a purchaser of their undivided shares of a parcel of land?
2. W/N a mother being her minor children’s guardian be authorized to sell a property owned by said minor children?
3. W/N in a contract where sale is conditional, failure of the ratification by the minor would cancel said contract?
4. W/N action to recover subject land is barred by prescription?
RULING:
1. The difference in the ages and in the legal capacity to contract of the four brothers and sisters created distinct liabilities on their part. The court below disregarded or overlooked this distinction, and to this extent it erred.
The first proposition formulated in the stipulation by the parties can affect only the signers of the deed of conveyance, Marcelo and Fe Sevara. Antonio and Olimpia, who were under age and took no part in the sale, are not bound by the agreement, regardless of its term and its intention of the contracting parties, unless the minors' action is barred by the statue of limitations, or the defendants possession has ripened into title by prescription, or estoppel has intervened.
2. Although the mother was said to be the minor children's guardian — an allegation on which there is not the slightest evidence — it does not appear that she was authorized to enter into this transaction or that the sale was approved by the competent court. Without the court's authority or approval, the sale was ineffective as to the minor children even if she were the minors' judicial guardian. A guardian has no authority to sell real estate of his ward, merely by reason of his general powers, and in the absence of any special authority to sell conferred by will, statue, or order of court. (28 C.J., 1133.) A sale of the wards realty of guardian without authority of the court is void. (Lafarga vs. Lafarga, 22 Phil., 374; Ledesma Hermanos vs. Castro, 55 Phil., 136; Drysdale's Succ., 130 La., 167; 57 S. 789; Loving vs. Craft, Tex. Civ. A, 228 S.W., 590; Palmer vs. Abrahams, 55 Wash., 352; 104 P., 648.)
3. Our interpretation of the contract leads us to a different result. We agree with counsel for the defendant that the provision regarding the ratification of the sale by the minors was intended as a protection of the purchasers. The phrase "Hacemos constar, tambien" clearly denotes continuity of thought — a notion to make ratification an additional safeguard of the purchasers right, like the warranty of the title and peaceful possession which was implied if not expressed.
The situation of the buyers was different. They evidently, and with reason, realized the defects of Fidela Enrile's legal capacity to act in behalf of his minor children. It might not suit them to keep only one-half of the parcel when and if the minors should choose to disaffirm the sale. It was but natural in the light of this uncertainty that they should have deem it wise to have inserted the stipulation that in the event of repudiation by the minors they could surrender the land and have their money back. But this was not to be the case necessarily. It might be to their convenience if and when disaffirmance materialized to adhere to the sale as to one-half interest in the land.
The reasonable interpretation of the condition of ratification seems therefore to be that it was in the nature of an option extended to the buyers either to call off the whole transaction or to stick to the sale with reference to the shares of the adult children who had full capacity to dispose of their property independently of the minor children's future action.
4. The present suit is essentially one to recover land. The right of this action of this character prescribes in ten years. Under section 40 of Act No. 190 an action for recovery of title to, or possession of legal property or an interest therein, may be brought within ten years after the cause of action accrues. Assuming that the cause of action accrued in 1936, the date when the contract was entered into, the period of ten tears expired two years after the action was begun, the complaint having been docketed on July 10, 1944. True, section 42 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that "If a person entitled to bring the action mentioned in the proceeding section of this Chapter is, at the time the cause of action accrues, within the age of minority, . . ., such person may, after expiration of ten years from the time the cause of action accrues, bring such action within three years after such disability is removed." It is also true that on July 10, 1944, when this action was filed, Antonio Inton was already 26 years of age, more than three years after he reach majority. But section 42 has been construed by this Court in relation of section 40 in the sense that, "If the three years after attainment of majority expires before the full ten-year period elapses, prescription becomes effective at the expiration of the latter period." (Ramos vs. Ramos, 45 Phil., 362).
There is no merit in the assignment of error that the application of the statute of limitation in this case is a departure from the theory of the defendant in his answer. Section 1 of Rule 25 entitled "Pre-trial" provides that the court shall make an order regarding the agreements of the parties as to any of the matters considered, and that such order when entered controls the subsequent course of action. It has been seen that the plaintiffs expressly set out in the stipulation that it was their contention the action was filed "within the period fixed by law.
The prayer for the annulment or rescission of the sale does not operate to efface the fundamental and prime objectives and nature of action, which is to recover real property. The annulment of the sale is not secondary. At any rate, being absolutely void, entitled to no authority or respect, the sale may be impeached in collateral proceeding by any one whose rights and interests in conflicts. There is no presumption of its validity.
In conclusion, we hold void in sale as to the shares of Antonio Inton and Olimpia Inton, and valid as to Marcelo's and Fe Severa's shares. Antonio and Olimpia shall refund to the defendant the sum paid by the Quintanas for the former's shares — P400. The deed of sale recites that this amount this amount was to be used for their education. This statement has not been disproved or denied. As to any improvement the defendant or his grantors may have introduce on the land, no evidence whatever was presented.
FACTS: Marcelo E. Inton, Fe Severa, E. Inton, Antonion E. Inton and Olimpia E. Inton, brothers and sisters, were the owners in equal and undivided shares of a parcel of land having an area of 15,167 square meters and situated in Samal, Bataan. On May 10, 1936, Macelo E. Inton, Fe Severa E. Inton, both of age, and their mother Fileda Enrile, the latter acting "in representation" of Antonio E. Inton and Olimpia E. Inton, then under age, sold that land to Alejandro Malibiran, husband and wife with a condition that contract is subject to ratification by the minors Antonio and Olimpia Inton upon reaching the age of majority.
By virtue of the sale, the purchaser took possession of the property and held it until 1942, when they died and the land, in the extrajudicial partition among their heirs, passed into the hands of Daniel Quintana, Alejandro Quintana's brother and the principal or virtually the sole defendant in this case.
Sometime in 1944, when Antonio Inton and Olimpia Inton had attained the age of majority, Daniel Quintana, so it is alleged, attempted to have them as well as their brother Marcelo and their sister Fe Sevarra execute an absolute deed of conveyance. The four brother and sisters not only refused but commended the instant suit.
ISSUES:
1. W/N minors are bound by a contract of sale entered into by their mother and siblings who are of legal age between a purchaser of their undivided shares of a parcel of land?
2. W/N a mother being her minor children’s guardian be authorized to sell a property owned by said minor children?
3. W/N in a contract where sale is conditional, failure of the ratification by the minor would cancel said contract?
4. W/N action to recover subject land is barred by prescription?
RULING:
1. The difference in the ages and in the legal capacity to contract of the four brothers and sisters created distinct liabilities on their part. The court below disregarded or overlooked this distinction, and to this extent it erred.
The first proposition formulated in the stipulation by the parties can affect only the signers of the deed of conveyance, Marcelo and Fe Sevara. Antonio and Olimpia, who were under age and took no part in the sale, are not bound by the agreement, regardless of its term and its intention of the contracting parties, unless the minors' action is barred by the statue of limitations, or the defendants possession has ripened into title by prescription, or estoppel has intervened.
2. Although the mother was said to be the minor children's guardian — an allegation on which there is not the slightest evidence — it does not appear that she was authorized to enter into this transaction or that the sale was approved by the competent court. Without the court's authority or approval, the sale was ineffective as to the minor children even if she were the minors' judicial guardian. A guardian has no authority to sell real estate of his ward, merely by reason of his general powers, and in the absence of any special authority to sell conferred by will, statue, or order of court. (28 C.J., 1133.) A sale of the wards realty of guardian without authority of the court is void. (Lafarga vs. Lafarga, 22 Phil., 374; Ledesma Hermanos vs. Castro, 55 Phil., 136; Drysdale's Succ., 130 La., 167; 57 S. 789; Loving vs. Craft, Tex. Civ. A, 228 S.W., 590; Palmer vs. Abrahams, 55 Wash., 352; 104 P., 648.)
3. Our interpretation of the contract leads us to a different result. We agree with counsel for the defendant that the provision regarding the ratification of the sale by the minors was intended as a protection of the purchasers. The phrase "Hacemos constar, tambien" clearly denotes continuity of thought — a notion to make ratification an additional safeguard of the purchasers right, like the warranty of the title and peaceful possession which was implied if not expressed.
The situation of the buyers was different. They evidently, and with reason, realized the defects of Fidela Enrile's legal capacity to act in behalf of his minor children. It might not suit them to keep only one-half of the parcel when and if the minors should choose to disaffirm the sale. It was but natural in the light of this uncertainty that they should have deem it wise to have inserted the stipulation that in the event of repudiation by the minors they could surrender the land and have their money back. But this was not to be the case necessarily. It might be to their convenience if and when disaffirmance materialized to adhere to the sale as to one-half interest in the land.
The reasonable interpretation of the condition of ratification seems therefore to be that it was in the nature of an option extended to the buyers either to call off the whole transaction or to stick to the sale with reference to the shares of the adult children who had full capacity to dispose of their property independently of the minor children's future action.
4. The present suit is essentially one to recover land. The right of this action of this character prescribes in ten years. Under section 40 of Act No. 190 an action for recovery of title to, or possession of legal property or an interest therein, may be brought within ten years after the cause of action accrues. Assuming that the cause of action accrued in 1936, the date when the contract was entered into, the period of ten tears expired two years after the action was begun, the complaint having been docketed on July 10, 1944. True, section 42 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that "If a person entitled to bring the action mentioned in the proceeding section of this Chapter is, at the time the cause of action accrues, within the age of minority, . . ., such person may, after expiration of ten years from the time the cause of action accrues, bring such action within three years after such disability is removed." It is also true that on July 10, 1944, when this action was filed, Antonio Inton was already 26 years of age, more than three years after he reach majority. But section 42 has been construed by this Court in relation of section 40 in the sense that, "If the three years after attainment of majority expires before the full ten-year period elapses, prescription becomes effective at the expiration of the latter period." (Ramos vs. Ramos, 45 Phil., 362).
There is no merit in the assignment of error that the application of the statute of limitation in this case is a departure from the theory of the defendant in his answer. Section 1 of Rule 25 entitled "Pre-trial" provides that the court shall make an order regarding the agreements of the parties as to any of the matters considered, and that such order when entered controls the subsequent course of action. It has been seen that the plaintiffs expressly set out in the stipulation that it was their contention the action was filed "within the period fixed by law.
The prayer for the annulment or rescission of the sale does not operate to efface the fundamental and prime objectives and nature of action, which is to recover real property. The annulment of the sale is not secondary. At any rate, being absolutely void, entitled to no authority or respect, the sale may be impeached in collateral proceeding by any one whose rights and interests in conflicts. There is no presumption of its validity.
In conclusion, we hold void in sale as to the shares of Antonio Inton and Olimpia Inton, and valid as to Marcelo's and Fe Severa's shares. Antonio and Olimpia shall refund to the defendant the sum paid by the Quintanas for the former's shares — P400. The deed of sale recites that this amount this amount was to be used for their education. This statement has not been disproved or denied. As to any improvement the defendant or his grantors may have introduce on the land, no evidence whatever was presented.
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