Sosito vs. Aguinaldo Dev't Corp.

Facts:

Manuel Sosito, Petitioner, was employed at a logging company in-charge of logging importation.  He went on an indefinite leave on January 16, 1976.  On July 20, 1976, the company through its President announced a Retrenchment Program offering a separation pay for employees who are in active service as of June 30, 1976.  Employees who wished to avail of the Retrenchment Program are to tender their Resignations before July 30, 1976.  The Petitioner accepted this offer and submitted his resignation on July 29, 1976 to avail himself of the gratuity benefits, however his resignation was never acted upon and he did not receive the separation pay.  He complained to the Department of Labor and the Labor Arbiter sustained him.  On appeal to the NLRC, the decision was reversed, hence Petitioner brought the matter to higher courts.

Issue:

WON Sosito was entitled for separation pay under the Retrenchment Program offered by Private Respondent?

Ruling:

We note that under the law then in force the private respondent could have validly reduced its work force because of its financial reverses without the obligation to grant separation pay. This was permitted under the original Article 272(a), of the Labor Code, 7 which was in force at the time. To its credit, however, the company voluntarily offered gratuities to those who would agree to be phased out pursuant to the terms and conditions of its retrenchment program, in recognition of their loyalty and to tide them over their own financial difficulties. The Court feels that such compassionate measure deserves commendation and support but at the same time rules that it should be available only to those who are qualified therefore. We hold that the petitioner is not one of them.

While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor. Management also has its own rights which, as such, are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play.

*** It is clear from the memorandum that the offer of separation pay was extended only to those who were in the active service of the company as of June 30, 1976. It is equally clear that the petitioner was not eligible for the promised gratuity as he was not actually working with the company as of the said date. Being on indefinite leave, he was not in the active service of the private respondent although, if one were to be technical, he was still in its employ. Even so, during the period of indefinite leave, he was not entitled to receive any salary or to enjoy any other benefits available to those in the active service.

Valenzuela Hardwood vs. CA

Transportation Law

 

FACTS:

Valenzuela Hardwood entered into an agreement with Seven Brothers whereby the latter undertook to load on board its vessel the former’s lauan round logs at the port of Maconacon, Isabela for shipment to Manila.  The charter party between Valenzuela Hardwood and Seven Brothers stipulated that the owners shall not be responsible for loss, split, short-landing, breakages and any kind of damages to the cargo. Valenzuela Hardwood insured the logs against loss and/or damage with South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc.  The vessel sank resulting in the loss of the insured logs.

ISSUE:

W/N defendant acted as a private carrier for it to be exempted from liability in case of loss?

HELD:

It is undisputed that private respondent had acted as a private carrier in transporting petitioner's lauan logs. Thus, Article 1745 and other Civil Code provisions on common carriers which were cited by petitioner may not be applied. 

In a contract of private carriage, the parties may validly stipulate that responsibility for the cargo rests solely on the charterer, exempting the shipowner from liability for loss of or damage to the cargo caused even by the negligence of the ship captain. Pursuant to Article 1306 17 of the Civil Code, such stipulation is valid because it is freely entered into by the parties and the same is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Indeed, their contract of private carriage is not even a contract of adhesion.

We stress that in a contract of private carriage, the parties may freely stipulate their duties and obligations which perforce would be binding on them. Unlike in a contract involving a common carrier, private carriage does not involve the general public. Hence, the stringent provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers protecting the general public cannot justifiably be applied to a ship transporting commercial goods as a private carrier.

De Facto Officer

(please see sources below)

De Facto Doctrine

The principle which holds that a person, who, by the proper authority is admitted and sworn into office is deemed to be rightfully in such office unit;

a.      by judicial declaration in a proper proceeding he is ousted therefrom

b.      his admission thereto is declared void

Purpose for the doctrine:

a.      To ensure the orderly functioning of the government.

b.      The public cannot afford to check the validity of the Officer’s title each and every time they transact with him.

When is a person a De Facto Officer?

Where the duties of the office are exercised under any of the following circumstances:

       * Without a known appointment or election, but under such circumstances of reputation or acquiescence as were calculated to induce people, without inquiry, to submit to or invoke his action, supposing him to the be the officer he assumed to be;  or

      * Under color of a known and valid appointment or election, but where the officer has failed to conform to some precedent requirement or condition (e.g., taking an oath or giving a bond);

     * Under color of a known election or appointment, void because:

            a)the officer was not eligible;

            b)there was a want of power in the electing or appointing body;

            c)there was a defect or irregularity in its exercise;

such ineligibility, want of power, or defect being unknown to the public.

    * Under color of an election or an appointment by or pursuant to a public, unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be such.

           Note:  Here, what is unconstitutional is not the act creating the office, but the act by which the officer is appointed to an office legally existing.  (Norton v. County of Shelby)

Sources: Philippine Administrative Law and Law on Public Officers by: Ruben Agpalo

              Public Officers @ www.angelfire.com 

Malaluan vs. COMELEC

G.R. # 120193

FACTS:

Petitioner Malaluan and Private Respondent Evangelista were both Mayoralty candidates.  Private Respondent was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly elected Mayor against the Petitioner.

Petitioner filed an election protest with the RTC contesting 64 out of the total 181 precincts of the said Municipality.  The trial court declared Petitioner as the duly elected Municipal Mayor.

The Private Respondent appealed the Trial Court’s decision to the COMELEC, which declared Private Respondent to be the duly elected Municipal Mayor.

The COMELEC found Petitioner liable for attorney’s fee, actual expenses for Xerox copies, and unearned salary and other emoluments, en masse denominated as actual damages. 

Petitioner naturally contests that propriety and legality of this award upon private respondent on the ground that said damages have not been alleged and proved during trial.  COMELEC on the other hand, concluded in justifying that Private Respondent be awarded actual damages, and hold that since Petitioner was adjudged the winner in the elections only by the Trial Court, the Petitioner is deemed to have occupied the position in an illegal manner as a Usurper.

ISSUE:

W/N Petitioner acted as a Usurper?

HELD:

We hold that petitioner was not a usurper because, while a usurper is one who undertakes to act officially without any color of right, the petitioner exercised the duties of an elective office under color of election thereto. It matters not that it was the trial court and not the COMELEC that declared petitioner as the winner, because both, at different stages of the electoral process, have the power to so proclaim winners in electoral contests.

We deem petitioner, therefore, to be a “de facto officer who, in good faith, has had possession of the office and had discharged the duties pertaining thereto” and is thus “legally entitled to the emoluments of the office.”

Codilla vs. Martinez

DE FACTO OFFICER

 

FACTS:

Mayor of Tagum designated his Vice Mayor to act in his place for the reason that he needs to attend to his sick brother in Negros Occidental, the designation takes effect until further advice from the Mayor.  The Vice Mayor had lung trouble and so he designated his ranking Councilor, who also was not in good health and designated the third ranking Councilor Jose Martinez, herein respondent.

When Martinez accepted his designation, and assumed office, his first official act being to separate from the service the petitioners as policemen of the Municipality in compliance with Sec. 682 of the Revised Administrative Code which provided that the appointment of Petitioners are in a temporary capacity, because they are not Civil Service Eligibles and such appointments were valid only for three months.

The action of Acting Mayor Martinez was validated when the incumbent Mayor endorsed and ratified the same by his subsequent official actuation; and that, not being Civil Service Eligibles, petitioners may be separated from service upon the expiration of the term of three months.

ISSUE: 

 W/N Acting Mayor Martinez’ designation as Acting Mayor was valid and W/N his actuation was legal?

HELD:

Although his designation was irregular, still he was acting under a color of authority, as distinguished from a usurper who is "one who has neither title nor color of right of an office. . . The acts of Jose L. Martinez are therefore official acts of a de facto officer. If they are made within the scope of the authority vested by the law in the office of the mayor of Tagum, such acts of a de facto office are here present.

An officer de facto is to be distinguished from an officer de jure, and is one who has the reputation or appearance of being the officer he assumes to be but who, in fact, under the law, has no right or title to the office he assumes to hold. He is distinguished from a mere usurper or intruder by the fact that the former holds by some color of right or title while the latter intrudes upon the office and assumes to exercise its functions without either the legal title or color of right to such office.

To constitute a de facto officer, there must be an office having a de facto existence, or at least one recognized by law and the claimant must be in actual possession of the office under color of title or authority. 

Another factor that may be invoked in favor of the validity of the official actuation of Acting Mayor Martinez is the fact that all his official acts done under his designation were subsequently endorsed and ratified by the incumbent mayor when he returned to office. This ratification served to cure any legal infirmity the acts of Acting Mayor Martinez may have suffered because of his irregular designation.

ASTURIAS SUGAR CENTRAL, INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and CTA September 30, 1969CASTRO, J.

Facts:

Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. is engaged in the production and milling of centrifugal sugar, the sugar so produced being placed in containers known as jute bags.  In 1957, It made two importations of jute bags, free from customs duties and special import tax upon the Petitioner’s filing of re-exportation and special import tax bond, conditioned upon the exportation of the jute bags within one year from the date of importation. 

However, out of the 44,800 jute bags imported first, only 8,647 were exported and only 25,000 were exported out of the 75,200 jute bags imported on the second shipment. In other words, of the total number of imported jute bags only 33,647 bags were exported within one year after their importation. The remaining 86,353 bags were exported after the expiration of the one-year period but within three years from their importation.

Petitioner requested the Commissioner of Customs for a week's extension of Re-exportation and Special Import Tax Bond no. 6 which was to expire the following day, citing reasons for its failure to export the remaining jute bags within the period of one year.  However, this request was denied by the Commissioner.

Due to the petitioner's failure to show proof of the exportation of the balance of 86,353 jute bags within one year from their importation, the Petitioner was required to pay the amount of p28,629.42 representing the customs duties and special import tax due thereon, which the petitioner paid under protest and later on demanded the refund of the amount it had paid.

Issues:

a.) Whether or not the Commissioner of Customs is vested with discretion to extend the period of one year provided for in section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909.

b.) Whether or not interpretation or construction of an ambiguous or uncertain statute by the Executive Department or other Administrative Agencies be given consideration?  In the case at bar, the Bureau of Customs.

Held:

a.) Section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act Of 1909 and the superseding sec. 105(x) of the Tariff and Customs Code, while fixing at one year the period within which the containers therein mentioned must be exported, are silent as to whether the said period may be extended. By reason of this silence, the Bureau of Customs Issued Administrative Orders 389 and 66 to eliminate confusion and provide a guide as to how it shall apply the law, and, more specifically, to make officially known its policy to consider the one-year period mentioned in the law as non-extendible.

b.) Considering that the statutory provisions in question (Section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909 and Sec. 105(x) of the Tariff and Customs Code) have not been the subject of previous judicial interpretation, then the application of the doctrine of "judicial respect for administrative construction (in the case at bar the Bureau of Customs issued Administrative Orders 389 and 66 to eliminate confusion and provide a guide as to how it shall apply the law, and, more specifically, to make officially known its policy to consider the one-year period mentioned in the law as non-extendible., " would, initially, be in order.

          Only where the court of last resort has not previously interpreted the statute is the rule applicable that courts will give consideration to construction by administrative or executive departments of the state.

          The formal or informal interpretation or practical construction of an ambiguous or uncertain statute or law by the executive department or other agency charged with its administration or enforcement is entitled to consideration and the highest respect from the courts, and must be accorded appropriate weight in determining the meaning of the law, especially when the construction or interpretation is long continued and uniform or is contemporaneous with the first workings of the statute, or when the enactment of the statute was suggested by such agency.

          Considering that the Bureau of Customs is the office charged with implementing and enforcing the provisions of our Tariff and Customs Code, the construction placed by it thereon should be given controlling weight.

          In applying the doctrine or principle of respect for administrative or practical construction, the courts often refer to several factors which may be regarded as bases of the principle, as factors leading the courts to give the principle controlling weight in particular instances, or as independent rules in themselves. These factors are the respect due the governmental agencies charged with administration, their competence, expertness, experience, and informed judgment and the fact that they frequently are the drafters of the law they interpret; that the agency is the one on which the legislature must rely to advise it as to the practical working out of the statute, and practical application of the statute presents the agency with unique opportunity and experiences for discovering deficiencies, inaccuracies, or improvements in the statute.