Thursday, March 10, 2022

Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC Case Digest

 THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents. G.R. No. 205728 , January 21, 2015

FACTS: 

Petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message "IBASURA RH Law" referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case.  This tarpaulin contains the heading "Conscience Vote" and lists candidates as either "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay" with a check mark, or "(Pro-RH) Team Patay" with an "X" mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law.  Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising "Team Patay," while those who voted against it form "Team Buhay".

Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names of candidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.

Respondent issued a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials addressed to petitioner. The election officer ordered the tarpaulin’s removal within three (3) days from receipt for being oversized. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for the size requirement of two feet (2’) by three feet (3’).

Petitioners replied requesting, among others, that a definite ruling be given by COMELEC Law Department regarding the tarpaulin; and pending this opinion and the availment of legal remedies, the tarpaulin be allowed to remain.

COMELEC Law Department then issued a letter ordering the immediate removal of the tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be constrained to file an election offense against petitioners.

Petitioners filed a Petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was violation of the Doctrine of Judicial Heirarchy?

RULING:

There was none. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance.

The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. This court has "full discretionary power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction [over] special civil actions for certiorari . . .filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition." As correctly pointed out by petitioners, we have provided exceptions to this doctrine:

First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time. In this case, the assailed issuances of respondents prejudice not only petitioners’ right to freedom of expression in the present case, but also of others in future similar cases.

A second exception is when the issues involved are of transcendental importance. In these cases, the imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for prudence.  In the case before this court, there is a clear threat to the paramount right of freedom of speech and freedom of expression which warrants invocation of relief from this court.

Third, cases of first impression warrant a direct resort to this court. In cases of first impression, no jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts on this matter.

Fourth, the constitutional issues raise dare better decided by this court. In this case, it is this court, with its constitutionally enshrined judicial power, that can rule with finality on whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion or performed acts contrary to the Constitution through the assailed issuances.

Fifth, the time element presented in this case cannot be ignored. This case was filed during the 2013 election period. Although the elections have already been concluded, future cases may be filed that necessitate urgency in its resolution. Exigency in certain situations would qualify as an exception for direct resort to this court.

Sixth, the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ. COMELEC is a constitutional body. In Albano v. Arranz, cited by petitioners, this court held that "[i]t is easy to realize the chaos that would ensue if the Court of First Instance of each and every province were [to] arrogate itself the power to disregard, suspend, or contradict any order of the Commission on Elections: that constitutional body would be speedily reduced to impotence."

In this case, if petitioners sought to annul the actions of COMELEC through pursuing remedies with the lower courts, any ruling on their part would not have been binding for other citizens whom respondents may place in the same situation. Besides, this court affords great respect to the Constitution and the powers and duties imposed upon COMELEC. Hence, a ruling by this court would be in the best interest of respondents, in order that their actions may be guided accordingly in the future.

Seventh, petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that could free them from the injurious effects of respondents’ acts in violation of their right to freedom of expression.

Eighth, the petition includes questions that are "dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy."

It is not, however, necessary that all of these exceptions must occur at the same time to justify a direct resort to this court. ***While generally, the hierarchy of courts is respected, the present case falls under the recognized exceptions and, as such, may be resolved by this court directly.

Thursday, March 3, 2022

MOOT AND ACADEMIC PRINCIPLE

 A case is said to be moot and/or academic when it "ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value."32 Thus, the courts "generally decline jurisdiction over the case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness."33

The "mootness" principle, however, does accept certain exceptions and the mere raising of an issue of "mootness" will not deter the courts from trying a case when there is a valid reason to do so. In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo (David), the Court provided four instances where courts can decide an otherwise moot case, thus: GECC

1.) There is a grave violation of the Constitution;

2.) The exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest is involved;

3.) When constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and

4.) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

(Narra Nickel vs. Redmont, G.R. No. 195580, April 21, 2014)

Great Pacific Life vs. CA

  G.R. No. 113899,  October 13, 1999   FACTS: A contract of group life insurance was executed between petitioner Grepalife) and DBP. G...