Great Pacific Life vs. CA

 G.R. No. 113899, October 13, 1999

 

FACTS:

A contract of group life insurance was executed between petitioner Grepalife) and DBP. Grepalife agreed to insure the lives of eligible housing loan mortgagors of DBP.

Dr. Wilfredo Leuterio, a housing debtor of DBP applied for membership in the group life insurance plan. In an application form, Dr. Leuterio answered yes to the question asking if he is in good health.

Grepalife issued Certificate No. B-18558, as insurance coverage of Dr. Leuterio, to the extent of his DBP mortgage indebtedness amounting to eighty-six thousand, two hundred (P86,200.00) pesos.

Dr. Leuterio died due to "massive cerebral hemorrhage." Consequently, DBP submitted a death claim to Grepalife. Grepalife denied the claim alleging that Dr. Leuterio was not physically healthy when he applied for an insurance coverage. Grepalife insisted that Dr. Leuterio did not disclose he had been suffering from hypertension, which caused his death.

The trial court rendered a decision in favor of respondent widow and against Grepalife. On May 17, 1993, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court’s decision. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUES:

 

a.     W/N Grepalife is liable to DBP which is not a party to the case for payment of the proceeds of a mortgage redemption insurance?

b.    W/N Grepalife will pay to DPB the amount of P86,200.00 in the absence of any evidence to show how much was the actual amount payable to DBP in accordance with its group insurance contract with defendant-appellant? 

HELD:

a.     The rationale of a group insurance policy of mortgagors, otherwise known as the "mortgage redemption insurance," is a device for the protection of both the mortgagee and the mortgagor. On the part of the mortgagee, it has to enter into such form of contract so that in the event of the unexpected demise of the mortgagor during the subsistence of the mortgage contract, the proceeds from such insurance will be applied to the payment of the mortgage debt, thereby relieving the heirs of the mortgagor from paying the obligation.  In a similar vein, ample protection is given to the mortgagor under such a concept so that in the event of death; the mortgage obligation will be extinguished by the application of the insurance proceeds to the mortgage indebtedness. Consequently, where the mortgagor pays the insurance premium under the group insurance policy, making the loss payable to the mortgagee, the insurance is on the mortgagor’s interest, and the mortgagor continues to be a party to the contract. In this type of policy insurance, the mortgagee is simply an appointee of the insurance fund, such loss-payable clause does not make the mortgagee a party to the contract.

 

Section 8 of the Insurance Code provides: "Unless the policy provides, where a mortgagor of property effects insurance in his own name providing that the loss shall be payable to the mortgagee, or assigns a policy of insurance to a mortgagee, the insurance is deemed to be upon the interest of the mortgagor, who does not cease to be a party to the original contract, and any act of his, prior to the loss, which would otherwise avoid the insurance, will have the same effect, although the property is in the hands of the mortgagee, but any act which, under the contract of insurance, is to be performed by the mortgagor, may be performed by the mortgagee therein named, with the same effect as if it had been performed by the mortgagor."

 

The insured private respondent did not cede to the mortgagee all his rights or interests in the insurance, the policy stating that: "In the event of the debtor’s death before his indebtedness with the Creditor [DBP] shall have been fully paid, an amount to pay the outstanding indebtedness shall first be paid to the creditor and the balance of sum assured, if there is any, shall then be paid to the beneficiary/ies designated by the debtor." When DBP submitted the insurance claim against petitioner, the latter denied payment thereof, interposing the defense of concealment committed by the insured. Thereafter, DBP collected the debt from the mortgagor and took the necessary action of foreclosure on the residential lot of private Respondent.

 

b.    Petitioner’s claim is without merit. A life insurance policy is a valued policy. Unless the interest of a person insured is susceptible of exact pecuniary measurement, the measure of indemnity under a policy of insurance upon life or health is the sum fixed in the policy.  The mortgagor paid the premium according to the coverage of his insurance, which states that:  "The policy states that upon receipt of due proof of the Debtor’s death during the terms of this insurance, a death benefit in the amount of P86,200.00 shall be paid. 

     In the event of the debtor’s death before his indebtedness with the creditor shall have been fully paid, an amount to pay the outstanding indebtedness shall first be paid to the Creditor and the balance of the Sum Assured, if there is any shall then be paid to the beneficiary/ies designated by the debtor."   However, DBP foreclosed in 1995 their residential lot, in satisfaction of mortgagor’s outstanding loan. Considering this supervening event, the insurance proceeds shall inure to the benefit of the heirs of the deceased person or his beneficiaries. Equity dictates that DBP should not unjustly enrich itself at the expense of another (Nemo cum alterius detrimenio protest). Hence, it cannot collect the insurance proceeds, after it already foreclosed on the mortgage. The proceeds now rightly belong to Dr. Leuterio’s heirs represented by his widow, herein private respondent Medarda Leuterio.

UMALE vs. CANOGA PARK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION CASE DIGEST

GEORGE LEONARD S. UMALE, Petitioner, vs. CANOGA PARK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent. 

G.R. No. 167246, July 20,2011 

FACTS:

The respondent filed an unlawful detainer case against the petitioner even before the expiration of the lease contract, because of alleged violation of stipulations in the lease contract regarding the use of the property. It was alleged that under the lease contract, the petitioner shall use the leased lot as a parking space for light vehicles and as a site for a small drivers’ canteen, and may not utilize the subject premises for other purposes without the respondent’s prior written consent. 

The petitioner, however, constructed restaurant buildings and other commercial establishments on the lot, without first securing the required written consent from the respondent, and the necessary permits and also subleased the property to various merchants-tenants in violation of the lease contract.

The MTC decided the case in favor of the respondent which decision was affirmed by the RTC. The case however, was re-raffled to another branch of the RTC when the Presiding Judge inhibited himself from resolving the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. The RTC to which the case was this time assigned granted the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration thereby reversing and setting aside the MTC decision. Accordingly, the case was dismissed for being prematurely filed. Thus, the respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals.

During the pendency of the petition for review, the respondent filed another case for unlawful detainer against the petitioner. This time the respondent used as a ground for ejectment the expiration of the parties’ lease contract. Judgment was rendered in favor of the respondent.

On appeal, the RTC reversed and set aside the decision of the MTC on the ground of litis pendentia. In the CA, the respondent argued that there exists no litis pendentia between the parties because the two cases involved different grounds for ejectment. The first case was filed because of violations of the lease contract, while the second case was filed due to the expiration of the lease contract. The respondent emphasized that the second case was filed based on an event or a cause not yet in existence at the time of the filing of the first case. The CA agreed and ordered the reinstatement of the decision of the MTC. It ruled that there was no litis pendentia because the two civil cases have different causes of action.

A petition for review on certiorari filed by the petitioner.

ISSUE:

               W/N there was litis pendentia?

RULING:

 The Court ruled that there was no litis pendentia, thus: xxx “As a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, litis pendentia refers to a situation where two actions are pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious. Litis pendentia exists when the following requisites are present: identity of the parties in the two actions; substantial identity in the causes of action and in the reliefs sought by the parties; and the identity between the two actions should be such that any judgment that may be rendered in one case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.”

In resolving the issue the Court mentioned the three tests to ascertain whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of action. The court proceeds thus: “x x x Of the three tests cited, the third one is especially applicable to the present case, i.e., whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first complaint - and to which [th]e [Court] answer[ed] in the negative.

The facts clearly show that the filing of the first ejectment case was grounded on the petitioner’s violation of stipulations in the lease contract, while the filing of the second case was based on the expiration of the lease contract. At the time the respondent filed the first ejectment complaint xxx the lease contract between the parties was still in effect, x x x It was only at the expiration of the lease contract that the cause of action in the second ejectment complaint accrued and made available to the respondent as a ground for ejecting the petitioner.

Thus, the cause of action in the second case was not yet in existence at the time of filing of the first ejectment case. In response to the petitioner’s contention that the similarity xxx rests on the reiteration in the second case of the cause of action in the first case, [th]e [Court] rule[s] that the restatement does not result in substantial identity between the two cases. Even if the respondent alleged violations of the lease contract as a ground for ejectment in the second complaint, the main basis for ejecting the petitioner in the second case was the expiration of the lease contract. If not for this subsequent development, the respondent could no longer file a second complaint for unlawful detainer because an ejectment complaint may only be filed within one year after the accrual of the cause of action, which, in the second case, was the expiration of the lease contract.”

 

Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC Case Digest

 THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents. G.R. No. 205728 , January 21, 2015

FACTS: 

Petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message "IBASURA RH Law" referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case.  This tarpaulin contains the heading "Conscience Vote" and lists candidates as either "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay" with a check mark, or "(Pro-RH) Team Patay" with an "X" mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law.  Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising "Team Patay," while those who voted against it form "Team Buhay".

Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names of candidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.

Respondent issued a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials addressed to petitioner. The election officer ordered the tarpaulin’s removal within three (3) days from receipt for being oversized. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for the size requirement of two feet (2’) by three feet (3’).

Petitioners replied requesting, among others, that a definite ruling be given by COMELEC Law Department regarding the tarpaulin; and pending this opinion and the availment of legal remedies, the tarpaulin be allowed to remain.

COMELEC Law Department then issued a letter ordering the immediate removal of the tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be constrained to file an election offense against petitioners.

Petitioners filed a Petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was violation of the Doctrine of Judicial Heirarchy?

RULING:

There was none. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance.

The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. This court has "full discretionary power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction [over] special civil actions for certiorari . . .filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition." As correctly pointed out by petitioners, we have provided exceptions to this doctrine:

First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time. In this case, the assailed issuances of respondents prejudice not only petitioners’ right to freedom of expression in the present case, but also of others in future similar cases.

A second exception is when the issues involved are of transcendental importance. In these cases, the imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for prudence.  In the case before this court, there is a clear threat to the paramount right of freedom of speech and freedom of expression which warrants invocation of relief from this court.

Third, cases of first impression warrant a direct resort to this court. In cases of first impression, no jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts on this matter.

Fourth, the constitutional issues raise dare better decided by this court. In this case, it is this court, with its constitutionally enshrined judicial power, that can rule with finality on whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion or performed acts contrary to the Constitution through the assailed issuances.

Fifth, the time element presented in this case cannot be ignored. This case was filed during the 2013 election period. Although the elections have already been concluded, future cases may be filed that necessitate urgency in its resolution. Exigency in certain situations would qualify as an exception for direct resort to this court.

Sixth, the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ. COMELEC is a constitutional body. In Albano v. Arranz, cited by petitioners, this court held that "[i]t is easy to realize the chaos that would ensue if the Court of First Instance of each and every province were [to] arrogate itself the power to disregard, suspend, or contradict any order of the Commission on Elections: that constitutional body would be speedily reduced to impotence."

In this case, if petitioners sought to annul the actions of COMELEC through pursuing remedies with the lower courts, any ruling on their part would not have been binding for other citizens whom respondents may place in the same situation. Besides, this court affords great respect to the Constitution and the powers and duties imposed upon COMELEC. Hence, a ruling by this court would be in the best interest of respondents, in order that their actions may be guided accordingly in the future.

Seventh, petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that could free them from the injurious effects of respondents’ acts in violation of their right to freedom of expression.

Eighth, the petition includes questions that are "dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy."

It is not, however, necessary that all of these exceptions must occur at the same time to justify a direct resort to this court. ***While generally, the hierarchy of courts is respected, the present case falls under the recognized exceptions and, as such, may be resolved by this court directly.

MOOT AND ACADEMIC PRINCIPLE

 A case is said to be moot and/or academic when it "ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value."32 Thus, the courts "generally decline jurisdiction over the case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness."33

The "mootness" principle, however, does accept certain exceptions and the mere raising of an issue of "mootness" will not deter the courts from trying a case when there is a valid reason to do so. In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo (David), the Court provided four instances where courts can decide an otherwise moot case, thus: GECC

1.) There is a grave violation of the Constitution;

2.) The exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest is involved;

3.) When constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and

4.) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

(Narra Nickel vs. Redmont, G.R. No. 195580, April 21, 2014)

Pardon versus Amnesty, Distinction

Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice.

Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction.

Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolished or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does "not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon," and it "in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence" article 36, Revised Penal Code). while amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.

Barrioquinto vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-1278, January 21, 1949

Plea Bargaining

What is plea bargaining?

Plea bargaining is defined  as “a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge” (Daan vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 163972-77; March 28, 2008).

Plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings and is authorized under the Rules of Court, Sec. Rule 116.

Plea Bargaining in Drug Cases:

Sec. 23 of RA 9165 which prohibited plea bargaining in drug cases was considered unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the case of Salvador Estipona, Jr. Vs. Lobrigo.

Estipona vs. Lobriga Case Digest

SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner, vs. HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

G.R. No. 226679

August 15, 2017

 

FACTS:

Petitioner is the accused for the crime of Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165, possession of dangerous drugs.  

He filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession.

In this petition, the constitutionality of Sec. 23, of R.A. 9165 prohibiting plea-bargaining, was being challenged.

 

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sec. 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it violates the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court?

 

RULING:

Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is declared unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.  

This Court asserted its discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of government. To reiterate, the Court's authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the safeguards of Our institutional independence.

While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this Court. Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads: Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

x x x x

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.