GEORGE LEONARD S. UMALE, Petitioner, vs. CANOGA PARK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 167246, July 20,2011
FACTS:
The respondent filed an unlawful detainer case against the petitioner even before the expiration of the lease contract, because of alleged violation of stipulations in the lease contract regarding the use of the property. It was alleged that under the lease contract, the petitioner shall use the leased lot as a parking space for light vehicles and as a site for a small drivers’ canteen, and may not utilize the subject premises for other purposes without the respondent’s prior written consent.
The petitioner, however, constructed restaurant buildings and other commercial establishments on the lot, without first securing the required written consent from the respondent, and the necessary permits and also subleased the property to various merchants-tenants in violation of the lease contract.
The MTC decided the case in favor of the respondent which decision was affirmed by the RTC. The case however, was re-raffled to another branch of the RTC when the Presiding Judge inhibited himself from resolving the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. The RTC to which the case was this time assigned granted the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration thereby reversing and setting aside the MTC decision. Accordingly, the case was dismissed for being prematurely filed. Thus, the respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals.
During the pendency of the petition for review, the respondent filed another case for unlawful detainer against the petitioner. This time the respondent used as a ground for ejectment the expiration of the parties’ lease contract. Judgment was rendered in favor of the respondent.
On appeal, the RTC reversed and set aside the decision of the MTC on the ground of litis pendentia. In the CA, the respondent argued that there exists no litis pendentia between the parties because the two cases involved different grounds for ejectment. The first case was filed because of violations of the lease contract, while the second case was filed due to the expiration of the lease contract. The respondent emphasized that the second case was filed based on an event or a cause not yet in existence at the time of the filing of the first case. The CA agreed and ordered the reinstatement of the decision of the MTC. It ruled that there was no litis pendentia because the two civil cases have different causes of action.
A petition for review on certiorari filed by the petitioner.
ISSUE:
W/N there was litis pendentia?
RULING:
The Court ruled that there was no litis pendentia, thus: xxx “As a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, litis pendentia refers to a situation where two actions are pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious. Litis pendentia exists when the following requisites are present: identity of the parties in the two actions; substantial identity in the causes of action and in the reliefs sought by the parties; and the identity between the two actions should be such that any judgment that may be rendered in one case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.”
In resolving the issue the Court mentioned the three tests to ascertain whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of action. The court proceeds thus: “x x x Of the three tests cited, the third one is especially applicable to the present case, i.e., whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first complaint - and to which [th]e [Court] answer[ed] in the negative.
The facts clearly show that the filing of the first ejectment case was grounded on the petitioner’s violation of stipulations in the lease contract, while the filing of the second case was based on the expiration of the lease contract. At the time the respondent filed the first ejectment complaint xxx the lease contract between the parties was still in effect, x x x It was only at the expiration of the lease contract that the cause of action in the second ejectment complaint accrued and made available to the respondent as a ground for ejecting the petitioner.
Thus, the cause of action in the second case was not yet in
existence at the time of filing of the first ejectment case. In response to the
petitioner’s contention that the similarity xxx rests on the reiteration in the
second case of the cause of action in the first case, [th]e [Court] rule[s]
that the restatement does not result in substantial identity between the two
cases. Even if the respondent alleged violations of the lease contract as a
ground for ejectment in the second complaint, the main basis for ejecting the
petitioner in the second case was the expiration of the lease contract. If not
for this subsequent development, the respondent could no longer file a second
complaint for unlawful detainer because an ejectment complaint may only be
filed within one year after the accrual of the cause of action, which, in the
second case, was the expiration of the lease contract.”
