Pardon versus Amnesty, Distinction

Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice.

Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction.

Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolished or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does "not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon," and it "in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence" article 36, Revised Penal Code). while amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.

Barrioquinto vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-1278, January 21, 1949

Plea Bargaining

What is plea bargaining?

Plea bargaining is defined  as “a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge” (Daan vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 163972-77; March 28, 2008).

Plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings and is authorized under the Rules of Court, Sec. Rule 116.

Plea Bargaining in Drug Cases:

Sec. 23 of RA 9165 which prohibited plea bargaining in drug cases was considered unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the case of Salvador Estipona, Jr. Vs. Lobrigo.

Estipona vs. Lobriga Case Digest

SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner, vs. HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

G.R. No. 226679

August 15, 2017

 

FACTS:

Petitioner is the accused for the crime of Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165, possession of dangerous drugs.  

He filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession.

In this petition, the constitutionality of Sec. 23, of R.A. 9165 prohibiting plea-bargaining, was being challenged.

 

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sec. 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it violates the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court?

 

RULING:

Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is declared unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.  

This Court asserted its discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of government. To reiterate, the Court's authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the safeguards of Our institutional independence.

While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this Court. Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads: Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

x x x x

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

Can An Adult Be Adopted?

Yes, an adult can be adopted provided that prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently considered and treated by the adopter as his/her own child since minority, provided further that adoptee, the children of the adopter, and the spouse of the adoptee, if any, give their consent to the adoption, as provided for in Sec. 8 and 9 of the Domestic Adoption Act.  

DOMESTIC ADOPTION ACT, RA 8552:

Section 8. Who May Be Adopted. – The following may be adopted:

(a) Any person below eighteen (18) years of age who has been administratively or judicially declared available for adoption;

(b) The legitimate son/daughter of one spouse by the other spouse;

(c) An illegitimate son/daughter by a qualified adopter to improve his/her status to that of legitimacy;

(d) A person of legal age if, prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently considered and treated by the adopter(s) as his/her own child since minority; ***Can a 22-yr.old person be adopted?

(e) A child whose adoption has been previously rescinded; or

(f) A child whose biological or adoptive parent(s) has died: Provided, That no proceedings shall be initiated within six (6) months from the time of death of said parent(s).

Section 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. – After being properly counseled and informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby required:

(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;

(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality which has legal custody of the child;

(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;

(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter if living with said adopter and the latter's spouse, if any; and

(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.

Prejudicial Question

A prejudicial question is defined to be that which arises in a case, the resolution of which question is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. 

ELEMENTS of a PREJUDICIAL QUESTION:

(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and

(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

REQUISITES of a PREJUDICIAL QUESTION:

The following requisites must be present for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case: 

(1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; 

(2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and 

(3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.

Prejudicial question has been defined to be that which arises in a case, the resolution of which question is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court; that is its first element. Jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal; this is the second element. 

In an action for bigamy for example, if the accused claims that the first marriage is null and void and the right to decide such validity is vested in another tribunal, the civil action for nullity must first be decided before the action for bigamy can proceed; hence, the validity of the first marriage is a prejudicial question. (People v. Aragon, 50 Off. Gaz. No. 10, 4863).

Imbong v.COMELEC Case Digest

G.R. No. L-32432; G.R. No. L-32443; 25 SCRA 28 September 11, 1970

FACTS:

Petitioners Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales, both interested in running as candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention, filed separate but related petitions questioning the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming that it prejudices their rights as such candidates. 

On March 16, 1967, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution, passed Resolution No. 2 which among others called for a Constitutional Convention to propose constitutional amendments to be composed of two delegates from each representative district who shall have the same qualifications as those of Congressmen.  

On June 17, 1969, Congress, also acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 4 amending the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 of March 16, 1967 by providing that the convention "shall be composed of 320 delegates apportioned among the existing representative districts according to the number of their respective inhabitants: Provided, that a representative district shall be entitled to at least two delegates, who shall have the same qualifications as those required of members of the House of Representatives."

Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales assails the validity of the entire law as well as the particular provisions embodied in Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a). Petitioner Manuel B. Imbong impugns the constitutionality of only par. I of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. No. 6132 practically on the same grounds advanced by petitioner Gonzales.

ISSUES:

1. W/N Sections 2, 4, 5 and par. 1 of 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 are valid provisions?

2. W/N the Congress has the authority to call for a constitutional convention?

3. W/N it has the power to enact the implementing rules while acting as legislative body?

HELD:

1. Sections 2, 4, 5 and par. 1 of 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 are valid provisions.

   a.) Sec. 2 on the apportionment of delegates: 

Unlike in the apportionment of representative districts, the Constitution does not expressly or impliedly require such apportionment of delegates to the convention on the basis of population in each congressional district. Congress, sitting as a Constituent Assembly, may constitutionally allocate one delegate for, each congressional district or for each province, for reasons of economy and to avoid having an unwieldy convention. 

   b.) The validity of Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6132: 

The validity of Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6132, which considers, all public officers and employees, whether elective or appointive, including members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as well as officers and employees of corporations or enterprises of the government, as resigned from the date of the filing of their certificates of candidacy, was recently sustained by this Court, on the grounds, inter alia, that the same is merely an application of and in consonance with the prohibition in Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution and that it does not constitute a denial of due process or of the equal protection of the law. 

  c.) Sec. 5 of R.A. 6132 is a valid provision:  

The challenged disqualification prescribed in Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 6132 is a valid limitation on the right to public office pursuant to state police power as it is reasonable and not arbitrary.

The discrimination under Sec. 5 against delegates to the Constitutional Convention is likewise constitutional; for it is based on a substantial distinction which makes for real differences, is germane to the purposes of the law, and applies to all members of the same class.

  d) Paragraph 1, Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is not violative of the constitutional guarantees of due process, equal protection of the laws, freedom of expressions, freedom of assembly and freedom of association.

It is therefore patent that the restriction contained in Sec. 8(a) is so narrow that the basic constitutional rights themselves remain substantially intact and inviolate. And it is therefore a valid infringement of the aforesaid constitutional guarantees invoked by petitioners.

2.  Yes. Congress, when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution, has full and plenary authority to propose Constitutional amendments or to call a convention for the purpose, by a three-fourths vote of each House in joint session assembled but voting separately.

3. Yes. Implementing details are matters within the competence of Congress in the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power, which power encompasses all matters not expressly or by necessary implication withdrawn or removed by the Constitution from the ambit of legislative action. And as lone as such statutory details do not clash with any specific provision of the constitution, they are valid.

RESOLUTION: 

WHEREFORE, the prayers in both petitions are hereby denied and R.A. No. 6132 including Secs. 2, 4, 5, and 8(a), paragraph 1, thereof, cannot be declared unconstitutional.