G.R.
No. 164007 August 10, 2006
FACTS:
President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo received intelligence reports that some
members of the AFP had abandoned their designated places of
assignment with the aim to destabilize the government. She then
directed the AFP and the PNP to track and arrest them.
A
total of 321 soldiers, including petitioners herein, surrendered to
the authorities. President Arroyo issued a proclamation declaring a
state of rebellion, followed by a General Order directing the AFP and
PNP to take all necessary measures to suppress the rebellion.
In
order to avoid a bloody confrontation, negotiations with the soldiers
were made which resulted to the soldiers' return to their barracks.
The
NBI investigated the incident and recommended that the military
personnel involved be charged with coup d’etat defined
and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. Hence, the Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) recommended the filing of the corresponding Information
against them.
Meanwhile,
pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, respondent AFP Chief
of Staff, ordered the arrest and detention of the soldiers involved
in the Oakwood incident and directed the AFP to conduct its own
separate investigation.
The
DOJ filed with the RTC, Makati City an Information for coup
d’etat against
those soldiers.
Respondent
Chief of Staff issued an order creating a Pre-Trial Investigation
Panel tasked to determine the propriety of filing with the military
tribunal charges for violations of Commonwealth Act No. 408, 4
(otherwise known as "The Articles of War"), as amended,
against the same military personnel.
Of
the original 321 accused only 243 (including petitioners herein)
filed with the RTC an Omnibus Motion praying that the said trial
court assume jurisdiction over all the charges filed with the
military tribunal. They invoked Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7055.
Subsequently,
the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Final Pre-Trial
Investigation Report to the JAGO, recommending that, following the
"doctrine of absorption," those charged with coup d'etat
before the RTC should not be charged before the military tribunal for
violation of the Articles of War.
For
its part, the RTC issued an Order stating that "all charges
before the court martial against the accused . . . are hereby
declared not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in
furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d'etat." The trial
court then proceeded to hear petitioners' applications for bail.
The
officer-in-charge of the JAGO, reviewed the findings of the Pre-Trial
Investigation Panel. He recommended that 29 of the officers involved
in the Oakwood incident, including petitioners, be prosecuted before
a general court martial for violation of Article 96 (conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War. The
same was approved by the AFP.
The
AFP Judge Advocate General then directed petitioners to submit their
answer to the charge. Instead of complying, they filed with this
Court the instant Petition for Prohibition praying that respondents
be ordered to desist from charging them with violation of Article 96
of the Articles of War in relation to the Oakwood incident.
Petitioners
maintain that since the RTC has made a determination that the offense
for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is not
service-connected, but is absorbed in the crime of coup d'etat, the
military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
1.Whether
or not the court martial may assume jurisdiction over those who have
been criminally charged of coup d’état before the regular courts?
2.
Whether or not the doctrine of absorption of crimes is applicable?
HELD:
1.
Yes. Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected. This is
expressly provided in Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055.
It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns
the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the
Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Such violation
allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession.
In short, the charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or
behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the
"service-connected" nature of the offense is the penalty
prescribed for the same — dismissal from the service — imposable
only by the military court. Such penalty is purely disciplinary in
character, evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of
misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military
discipline.
Hence,
there is no merit in petitioners argument that they can no longer be
charged before the court martial for violation of Article 96 of the
Articles of War because the same has been declared by the RTC in its
Order of February 11, 2004 as "not service-connected, but rather
absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d'etat,"
hence, triable by said court (RTC). The RTC, in making such
declaration, practically amended the law which expressly vests in the
court martial the jurisdiction over "service-connected crimes or
offenses." What the law has conferred the court should not take
away. It is only the Constitution or the law that bestows
jurisdiction on the court, tribunal, body or officer over the subject
matter or nature of an action which can do so. And it is only through
a constitutional amendment or legislative enactment that such act can
be done. The first and fundamental duty of the courts is merely to
apply the law "as they find it, not as they like it to be.
Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is,
therefore, void.
2.
No. The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling
by holding that the charge of Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a
Gentleman is absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged crime of coup
d'etat. Firstly, the doctrine of ‘absorption of crimes' is peculiar
to criminal law and generally applies to crimes punished by the same
statute, unlike here where different statutes are involved. Secondly,
the doctrine applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over
both offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of
jurisdiction over service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of
the Articles of War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is
not applicable to this case.
