Valenzuela Hardwood vs. CA

Transportation Law

 

FACTS:

Valenzuela Hardwood entered into an agreement with Seven Brothers whereby the latter undertook to load on board its vessel the former’s lauan round logs at the port of Maconacon, Isabela for shipment to Manila.  The charter party between Valenzuela Hardwood and Seven Brothers stipulated that the owners shall not be responsible for loss, split, short-landing, breakages and any kind of damages to the cargo. Valenzuela Hardwood insured the logs against loss and/or damage with South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc.  The vessel sank resulting in the loss of the insured logs.

ISSUE:

W/N defendant acted as a private carrier for it to be exempted from liability in case of loss?

HELD:

It is undisputed that private respondent had acted as a private carrier in transporting petitioner's lauan logs. Thus, Article 1745 and other Civil Code provisions on common carriers which were cited by petitioner may not be applied. 

In a contract of private carriage, the parties may validly stipulate that responsibility for the cargo rests solely on the charterer, exempting the shipowner from liability for loss of or damage to the cargo caused even by the negligence of the ship captain. Pursuant to Article 1306 17 of the Civil Code, such stipulation is valid because it is freely entered into by the parties and the same is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Indeed, their contract of private carriage is not even a contract of adhesion.

We stress that in a contract of private carriage, the parties may freely stipulate their duties and obligations which perforce would be binding on them. Unlike in a contract involving a common carrier, private carriage does not involve the general public. Hence, the stringent provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers protecting the general public cannot justifiably be applied to a ship transporting commercial goods as a private carrier.

De Facto Officer

(please see sources below)

De Facto Doctrine

The principle which holds that a person, who, by the proper authority is admitted and sworn into office is deemed to be rightfully in such office unit;

a.      by judicial declaration in a proper proceeding he is ousted therefrom

b.      his admission thereto is declared void

Purpose for the doctrine:

a.      To ensure the orderly functioning of the government.

b.      The public cannot afford to check the validity of the Officer’s title each and every time they transact with him.

When is a person a De Facto Officer?

Where the duties of the office are exercised under any of the following circumstances:

       * Without a known appointment or election, but under such circumstances of reputation or acquiescence as were calculated to induce people, without inquiry, to submit to or invoke his action, supposing him to the be the officer he assumed to be;  or

      * Under color of a known and valid appointment or election, but where the officer has failed to conform to some precedent requirement or condition (e.g., taking an oath or giving a bond);

     * Under color of a known election or appointment, void because:

            a)the officer was not eligible;

            b)there was a want of power in the electing or appointing body;

            c)there was a defect or irregularity in its exercise;

such ineligibility, want of power, or defect being unknown to the public.

    * Under color of an election or an appointment by or pursuant to a public, unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be such.

           Note:  Here, what is unconstitutional is not the act creating the office, but the act by which the officer is appointed to an office legally existing.  (Norton v. County of Shelby)

Sources: Philippine Administrative Law and Law on Public Officers by: Ruben Agpalo

              Public Officers @ www.angelfire.com 

Malaluan vs. COMELEC

G.R. # 120193

FACTS:

Petitioner Malaluan and Private Respondent Evangelista were both Mayoralty candidates.  Private Respondent was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly elected Mayor against the Petitioner.

Petitioner filed an election protest with the RTC contesting 64 out of the total 181 precincts of the said Municipality.  The trial court declared Petitioner as the duly elected Municipal Mayor.

The Private Respondent appealed the Trial Court’s decision to the COMELEC, which declared Private Respondent to be the duly elected Municipal Mayor.

The COMELEC found Petitioner liable for attorney’s fee, actual expenses for Xerox copies, and unearned salary and other emoluments, en masse denominated as actual damages. 

Petitioner naturally contests that propriety and legality of this award upon private respondent on the ground that said damages have not been alleged and proved during trial.  COMELEC on the other hand, concluded in justifying that Private Respondent be awarded actual damages, and hold that since Petitioner was adjudged the winner in the elections only by the Trial Court, the Petitioner is deemed to have occupied the position in an illegal manner as a Usurper.

ISSUE:

W/N Petitioner acted as a Usurper?

HELD:

We hold that petitioner was not a usurper because, while a usurper is one who undertakes to act officially without any color of right, the petitioner exercised the duties of an elective office under color of election thereto. It matters not that it was the trial court and not the COMELEC that declared petitioner as the winner, because both, at different stages of the electoral process, have the power to so proclaim winners in electoral contests.

We deem petitioner, therefore, to be a “de facto officer who, in good faith, has had possession of the office and had discharged the duties pertaining thereto” and is thus “legally entitled to the emoluments of the office.”

Codilla vs. Martinez

DE FACTO OFFICER

 

FACTS:

Mayor of Tagum designated his Vice Mayor to act in his place for the reason that he needs to attend to his sick brother in Negros Occidental, the designation takes effect until further advice from the Mayor.  The Vice Mayor had lung trouble and so he designated his ranking Councilor, who also was not in good health and designated the third ranking Councilor Jose Martinez, herein respondent.

When Martinez accepted his designation, and assumed office, his first official act being to separate from the service the petitioners as policemen of the Municipality in compliance with Sec. 682 of the Revised Administrative Code which provided that the appointment of Petitioners are in a temporary capacity, because they are not Civil Service Eligibles and such appointments were valid only for three months.

The action of Acting Mayor Martinez was validated when the incumbent Mayor endorsed and ratified the same by his subsequent official actuation; and that, not being Civil Service Eligibles, petitioners may be separated from service upon the expiration of the term of three months.

ISSUE: 

 W/N Acting Mayor Martinez’ designation as Acting Mayor was valid and W/N his actuation was legal?

HELD:

Although his designation was irregular, still he was acting under a color of authority, as distinguished from a usurper who is "one who has neither title nor color of right of an office. . . The acts of Jose L. Martinez are therefore official acts of a de facto officer. If they are made within the scope of the authority vested by the law in the office of the mayor of Tagum, such acts of a de facto office are here present.

An officer de facto is to be distinguished from an officer de jure, and is one who has the reputation or appearance of being the officer he assumes to be but who, in fact, under the law, has no right or title to the office he assumes to hold. He is distinguished from a mere usurper or intruder by the fact that the former holds by some color of right or title while the latter intrudes upon the office and assumes to exercise its functions without either the legal title or color of right to such office.

To constitute a de facto officer, there must be an office having a de facto existence, or at least one recognized by law and the claimant must be in actual possession of the office under color of title or authority. 

Another factor that may be invoked in favor of the validity of the official actuation of Acting Mayor Martinez is the fact that all his official acts done under his designation were subsequently endorsed and ratified by the incumbent mayor when he returned to office. This ratification served to cure any legal infirmity the acts of Acting Mayor Martinez may have suffered because of his irregular designation.