Can An Adult Be Adopted?

Yes, an adult can be adopted provided that prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently considered and treated by the adopter as his/her own child since minority, provided further that adoptee, the children of the adopter, and the spouse of the adoptee, if any, give their consent to the adoption, as provided for in Sec. 8 and 9 of the Domestic Adoption Act.  

DOMESTIC ADOPTION ACT, RA 8552:

Section 8. Who May Be Adopted. – The following may be adopted:

(a) Any person below eighteen (18) years of age who has been administratively or judicially declared available for adoption;

(b) The legitimate son/daughter of one spouse by the other spouse;

(c) An illegitimate son/daughter by a qualified adopter to improve his/her status to that of legitimacy;

(d) A person of legal age if, prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently considered and treated by the adopter(s) as his/her own child since minority; ***Can a 22-yr.old person be adopted?

(e) A child whose adoption has been previously rescinded; or

(f) A child whose biological or adoptive parent(s) has died: Provided, That no proceedings shall be initiated within six (6) months from the time of death of said parent(s).

Section 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. – After being properly counseled and informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby required:

(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;

(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality which has legal custody of the child;

(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;

(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter if living with said adopter and the latter's spouse, if any; and

(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.

Prejudicial Question

A prejudicial question is defined to be that which arises in a case, the resolution of which question is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. 

ELEMENTS of a PREJUDICIAL QUESTION:

(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and

(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

REQUISITES of a PREJUDICIAL QUESTION:

The following requisites must be present for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case: 

(1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; 

(2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and 

(3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.

Prejudicial question has been defined to be that which arises in a case, the resolution of which question is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court; that is its first element. Jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal; this is the second element. 

In an action for bigamy for example, if the accused claims that the first marriage is null and void and the right to decide such validity is vested in another tribunal, the civil action for nullity must first be decided before the action for bigamy can proceed; hence, the validity of the first marriage is a prejudicial question. (People v. Aragon, 50 Off. Gaz. No. 10, 4863).

Imbong v.COMELEC Case Digest

G.R. No. L-32432; G.R. No. L-32443; 25 SCRA 28 September 11, 1970

FACTS:

Petitioners Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales, both interested in running as candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention, filed separate but related petitions questioning the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming that it prejudices their rights as such candidates. 

On March 16, 1967, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution, passed Resolution No. 2 which among others called for a Constitutional Convention to propose constitutional amendments to be composed of two delegates from each representative district who shall have the same qualifications as those of Congressmen.  

On June 17, 1969, Congress, also acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 4 amending the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 of March 16, 1967 by providing that the convention "shall be composed of 320 delegates apportioned among the existing representative districts according to the number of their respective inhabitants: Provided, that a representative district shall be entitled to at least two delegates, who shall have the same qualifications as those required of members of the House of Representatives."

Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales assails the validity of the entire law as well as the particular provisions embodied in Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a). Petitioner Manuel B. Imbong impugns the constitutionality of only par. I of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. No. 6132 practically on the same grounds advanced by petitioner Gonzales.

ISSUES:

1. W/N Sections 2, 4, 5 and par. 1 of 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 are valid provisions?

2. W/N the Congress has the authority to call for a constitutional convention?

3. W/N it has the power to enact the implementing rules while acting as legislative body?

HELD:

1. Sections 2, 4, 5 and par. 1 of 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 are valid provisions.

   a.) Sec. 2 on the apportionment of delegates: 

Unlike in the apportionment of representative districts, the Constitution does not expressly or impliedly require such apportionment of delegates to the convention on the basis of population in each congressional district. Congress, sitting as a Constituent Assembly, may constitutionally allocate one delegate for, each congressional district or for each province, for reasons of economy and to avoid having an unwieldy convention. 

   b.) The validity of Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6132: 

The validity of Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6132, which considers, all public officers and employees, whether elective or appointive, including members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as well as officers and employees of corporations or enterprises of the government, as resigned from the date of the filing of their certificates of candidacy, was recently sustained by this Court, on the grounds, inter alia, that the same is merely an application of and in consonance with the prohibition in Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution and that it does not constitute a denial of due process or of the equal protection of the law. 

  c.) Sec. 5 of R.A. 6132 is a valid provision:  

The challenged disqualification prescribed in Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 6132 is a valid limitation on the right to public office pursuant to state police power as it is reasonable and not arbitrary.

The discrimination under Sec. 5 against delegates to the Constitutional Convention is likewise constitutional; for it is based on a substantial distinction which makes for real differences, is germane to the purposes of the law, and applies to all members of the same class.

  d) Paragraph 1, Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is not violative of the constitutional guarantees of due process, equal protection of the laws, freedom of expressions, freedom of assembly and freedom of association.

It is therefore patent that the restriction contained in Sec. 8(a) is so narrow that the basic constitutional rights themselves remain substantially intact and inviolate. And it is therefore a valid infringement of the aforesaid constitutional guarantees invoked by petitioners.

2.  Yes. Congress, when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution, has full and plenary authority to propose Constitutional amendments or to call a convention for the purpose, by a three-fourths vote of each House in joint session assembled but voting separately.

3. Yes. Implementing details are matters within the competence of Congress in the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power, which power encompasses all matters not expressly or by necessary implication withdrawn or removed by the Constitution from the ambit of legislative action. And as lone as such statutory details do not clash with any specific provision of the constitution, they are valid.

RESOLUTION: 

WHEREFORE, the prayers in both petitions are hereby denied and R.A. No. 6132 including Secs. 2, 4, 5, and 8(a), paragraph 1, thereof, cannot be declared unconstitutional.

De Lima et.al vs. Gatdula Case Digest

G.R. No. 204528
Feb. 19, 2013
En Banc


FACTS:
Respondent Gatdula filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo in the RTC of Manila, directed against petitioners.

Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo or not, the judge issued summons and ordered the petitioners to file an answer.  He also set the case for hearing.

The counsel for petitioners manifested that a Return and not an Answer is appropriate for Amparo cases but the Judge opined that the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure applied since an Amparo case is summary in nature, thus, required an Answer.

The hearing was conducted and the judge ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda.

RTC then rendered a decision granting the issuance of the Writ of Amparo and interim reliefs prayed for namely: Temporary protection, production and inspection orders.

The decision was assailed by the petitioners through a Petition for Review on Certiorari via Rule 45 as enunciated in Sec. 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of an Answer was appropriate?
2. Whether or not the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure apply in a Petition for Writ of Amparo?
3. Whether or not the holding of the hearing on the main case was proper?
4. Whether or not the filing of the memorandum was proper?
5. Whether or not the decision granting the privilege of the Writ and the interim reliefs was correct?
6. Whether or not the mode of appeal under Rule 45 availed by the Petitioners was correct?

RULING:
1. No. It is the Return that serves as the responsive pleading for petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo.

2. The Revised Rules of Summary Procedures apply only to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling how this rule could possibly apply to proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the application of summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a special proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or particular fact.34 It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is seriously misplaced.

3. No. The holding of the hearing without the Return was not proper. There will be a summary hearing only after the Return is filed to determine the merits of the petition and whether interim reliefs are warranted. If the Return is not filed, the hearing will be done ex parte.

4. No. A memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

5. No. The decision was not correct.  This gives the impression that the decision was the judgment since the phraseology is similar to Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo:

"SEC. 18. Judgment. — The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied." (Emphasis supplied).

The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the actual order called the Writ of Amparo. The privilege includes availment of the entire procedure outlined in the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. The judgment should detail the required acts from the respondents that will mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the petitioner's life, liberty or security.

A judgment which simply grants "the privilege of the writ" cannot be executed.

6. The Petition for Review is not the proper remedy to assail the interlocutory order. A Petition for Certiorari, on the other hand, is prohibited. Simply dismissing the present petition, however, will cause grave injustice to the parties involved. It undermines the salutary purposes for which the Rule on the Writ of Amparo were promulgated.

HELD:
(1) NULLIFY all orders issued by the Judge in relation to this Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo case;

(2) DIRECT the Judge to determine within forty-eight (48) hours from his receipt of this Resolution whether the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is proper on the basis of the petition and its attached affidavits.

Penned by: Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen

Gonzales vs. Abaya

G.R. No. 164007 August 10, 2006

FACTS:

President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo received intelligence reports that some members of the AFP had abandoned their designated places of assignment with the aim to destabilize the government. She then directed the AFP and the PNP to track and arrest them.

A total of 321 soldiers, including petitioners herein, surrendered to the authorities. President Arroyo issued a proclamation declaring a state of rebellion, followed by a General Order directing the AFP and PNP to take all necessary measures to suppress the rebellion.

In order to avoid a bloody confrontation, negotiations with the soldiers were made which resulted to the soldiers' return to their barracks.

The NBI investigated the incident and recommended that the military personnel involved be charged with coup d’etat defined and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Hence, the Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ) recommended the filing of the corresponding Information against them.

Meanwhile, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, respondent AFP Chief of Staff, ordered the arrest and detention of the soldiers involved in the Oakwood incident and directed the AFP to conduct its own separate investigation.

The DOJ filed with the RTC, Makati City an Information for coup d’etat against those soldiers.

Respondent Chief of Staff issued an order creating a Pre-Trial Investigation Panel tasked to determine the propriety of filing with the military tribunal charges for violations of Commonwealth Act No. 408, 4 (otherwise known as "The Articles of War"), as amended, against the same military personnel. 

Of the original 321 accused only 243 (including petitioners herein) filed with the RTC an Omnibus Motion praying that the said trial court assume jurisdiction over all the charges filed with the military tribunal. They invoked Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7055. 

Subsequently, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Final Pre-Trial Investigation Report to the JAGO, recommending that, following the "doctrine of absorption," those charged with coup d'etat before the RTC should not be charged before the military tribunal for violation of the Articles of War. 

For its part, the RTC issued an Order stating that "all charges before the court martial against the accused . . . are hereby declared not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d'etat." The trial court then proceeded to hear petitioners' applications for bail. 

The officer-in-charge of the JAGO, reviewed the findings of the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel. He recommended that 29 of the officers involved in the Oakwood incident, including petitioners, be prosecuted before a general court martial for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War. The same was approved by the AFP. 

The AFP Judge Advocate General then directed petitioners to submit their answer to the charge. Instead of complying, they filed with this Court the instant Petition for Prohibition praying that respondents be ordered to desist from charging them with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War in relation to the Oakwood incident. 

Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a determination that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is not service-connected, but is absorbed in the crime of coup d'etat, the military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its jurisdiction. 

ISSUE: 

1.Whether or not the court martial may assume jurisdiction over those who have been criminally charged of coup d’état before the regular courts?

2. Whether or not the doctrine of absorption of crimes is applicable?

HELD: 

1. Yes. Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected. This is expressly provided in Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the "service-connected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same — dismissal from the service — imposable only by the military court. Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military discipline. 

Hence, there is no merit in petitioners argument that they can no longer be charged before the court martial for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War because the same has been declared by the RTC in its Order of February 11, 2004 as "not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d'etat," hence, triable by said court (RTC). The RTC, in making such declaration, practically amended the law which expressly vests in the court martial the jurisdiction over "service-connected crimes or offenses." What the law has conferred the court should not take away. It is only the Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction on the court, tribunal, body or officer over the subject matter or nature of an action which can do so. And it is only through a constitutional amendment or legislative enactment that such act can be done. The first and fundamental duty of the courts is merely to apply the law "as they find it, not as they like it to be. Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void. 

2. No. The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that the charge of Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman is absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged crime of coup d'etat. Firstly, the doctrine of ‘absorption of crimes' is peculiar to criminal law and generally applies to crimes punished by the same statute, unlike here where different statutes are involved. Secondly, the doctrine applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not applicable to this case.

Yao Kee vs. Sy-Gonzales

Case Digest

G.R. No. L-55960 

November 24, 1988

Facts:

Sy Kiat, a Chinese national died in Caloocan City where he was then residing, leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth P300,000.00 more or less.

Thereafter, respondents filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration and appointment as administratrix one of the respondents.

The petition was opposed by the petitioners alleging that: (a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married in China; (b) the other oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased with Yao Kee; and, (c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is competent, willing and desirous to become the administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat.

The lower court ruled that Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat and the other oppositors are the legitimate children.  The eldest was appointed as the administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat.

However, Court of Appeals modified the decision and rendered that the legality of the marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee had not been proven to be valid to the laws of China.

Issue:

Whether or not oral testimonies, such as those presented by the petitioners are sufficient to establish validity of foreign marriage?

Ruling:

To establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence.  Without proofs of said requisites, the foreign marriage cannot be recognized in this country.

In this case the petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies presented cannot be considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only because they are self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.

Garcia vs. Recio

Case Digest
G.R. No. 138322

Facts:

Respondent, a Filipino, was married to an Australian citizen. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. Two years later, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.

Sometime later respondent became an Australian citizen and married Petitioner -- a Filipina in Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino.

Petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.  Petitioner then filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her. She claimed that she learned of respondent’s prior marriage to an Australian citizen only at a later time.

Respondent averred that, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution.  He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner.

About five years after the couple’s wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending -- respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia.

Issue:

Whether or not the divorce decree obtained abroad may be ipso facto admitted as evidence in Philippine courts?

Ruling:

No. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.