Gonzales vs. Abaya

G.R. No. 164007 August 10, 2006

FACTS:

President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo received intelligence reports that some members of the AFP had abandoned their designated places of assignment with the aim to destabilize the government. She then directed the AFP and the PNP to track and arrest them.

A total of 321 soldiers, including petitioners herein, surrendered to the authorities. President Arroyo issued a proclamation declaring a state of rebellion, followed by a General Order directing the AFP and PNP to take all necessary measures to suppress the rebellion.

In order to avoid a bloody confrontation, negotiations with the soldiers were made which resulted to the soldiers' return to their barracks.

The NBI investigated the incident and recommended that the military personnel involved be charged with coup d’etat defined and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Hence, the Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ) recommended the filing of the corresponding Information against them.

Meanwhile, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, respondent AFP Chief of Staff, ordered the arrest and detention of the soldiers involved in the Oakwood incident and directed the AFP to conduct its own separate investigation.

The DOJ filed with the RTC, Makati City an Information for coup d’etat against those soldiers.

Respondent Chief of Staff issued an order creating a Pre-Trial Investigation Panel tasked to determine the propriety of filing with the military tribunal charges for violations of Commonwealth Act No. 408, 4 (otherwise known as "The Articles of War"), as amended, against the same military personnel. 

Of the original 321 accused only 243 (including petitioners herein) filed with the RTC an Omnibus Motion praying that the said trial court assume jurisdiction over all the charges filed with the military tribunal. They invoked Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7055. 

Subsequently, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Final Pre-Trial Investigation Report to the JAGO, recommending that, following the "doctrine of absorption," those charged with coup d'etat before the RTC should not be charged before the military tribunal for violation of the Articles of War. 

For its part, the RTC issued an Order stating that "all charges before the court martial against the accused . . . are hereby declared not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d'etat." The trial court then proceeded to hear petitioners' applications for bail. 

The officer-in-charge of the JAGO, reviewed the findings of the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel. He recommended that 29 of the officers involved in the Oakwood incident, including petitioners, be prosecuted before a general court martial for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War. The same was approved by the AFP. 

The AFP Judge Advocate General then directed petitioners to submit their answer to the charge. Instead of complying, they filed with this Court the instant Petition for Prohibition praying that respondents be ordered to desist from charging them with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War in relation to the Oakwood incident. 

Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a determination that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is not service-connected, but is absorbed in the crime of coup d'etat, the military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its jurisdiction. 

ISSUE: 

1.Whether or not the court martial may assume jurisdiction over those who have been criminally charged of coup d’état before the regular courts?

2. Whether or not the doctrine of absorption of crimes is applicable?

HELD: 

1. Yes. Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected. This is expressly provided in Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the "service-connected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same — dismissal from the service — imposable only by the military court. Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military discipline. 

Hence, there is no merit in petitioners argument that they can no longer be charged before the court martial for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War because the same has been declared by the RTC in its Order of February 11, 2004 as "not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d'etat," hence, triable by said court (RTC). The RTC, in making such declaration, practically amended the law which expressly vests in the court martial the jurisdiction over "service-connected crimes or offenses." What the law has conferred the court should not take away. It is only the Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction on the court, tribunal, body or officer over the subject matter or nature of an action which can do so. And it is only through a constitutional amendment or legislative enactment that such act can be done. The first and fundamental duty of the courts is merely to apply the law "as they find it, not as they like it to be. Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void. 

2. No. The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that the charge of Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman is absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged crime of coup d'etat. Firstly, the doctrine of ‘absorption of crimes' is peculiar to criminal law and generally applies to crimes punished by the same statute, unlike here where different statutes are involved. Secondly, the doctrine applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not applicable to this case.