Valenzuela Hardwood vs. CA

Transportation Law

 

FACTS:

Valenzuela Hardwood entered into an agreement with Seven Brothers whereby the latter undertook to load on board its vessel the former’s lauan round logs at the port of Maconacon, Isabela for shipment to Manila.  The charter party between Valenzuela Hardwood and Seven Brothers stipulated that the owners shall not be responsible for loss, split, short-landing, breakages and any kind of damages to the cargo. Valenzuela Hardwood insured the logs against loss and/or damage with South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc.  The vessel sank resulting in the loss of the insured logs.

ISSUE:

W/N defendant acted as a private carrier for it to be exempted from liability in case of loss?

HELD:

It is undisputed that private respondent had acted as a private carrier in transporting petitioner's lauan logs. Thus, Article 1745 and other Civil Code provisions on common carriers which were cited by petitioner may not be applied. 

In a contract of private carriage, the parties may validly stipulate that responsibility for the cargo rests solely on the charterer, exempting the shipowner from liability for loss of or damage to the cargo caused even by the negligence of the ship captain. Pursuant to Article 1306 17 of the Civil Code, such stipulation is valid because it is freely entered into by the parties and the same is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Indeed, their contract of private carriage is not even a contract of adhesion.

We stress that in a contract of private carriage, the parties may freely stipulate their duties and obligations which perforce would be binding on them. Unlike in a contract involving a common carrier, private carriage does not involve the general public. Hence, the stringent provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers protecting the general public cannot justifiably be applied to a ship transporting commercial goods as a private carrier.

De Facto Officer

(please see sources below)

De Facto Doctrine

The principle which holds that a person, who, by the proper authority is admitted and sworn into office is deemed to be rightfully in such office unit;

a.      by judicial declaration in a proper proceeding he is ousted therefrom

b.      his admission thereto is declared void

Purpose for the doctrine:

a.      To ensure the orderly functioning of the government.

b.      The public cannot afford to check the validity of the Officer’s title each and every time they transact with him.

When is a person a De Facto Officer?

Where the duties of the office are exercised under any of the following circumstances:

       * Without a known appointment or election, but under such circumstances of reputation or acquiescence as were calculated to induce people, without inquiry, to submit to or invoke his action, supposing him to the be the officer he assumed to be;  or

      * Under color of a known and valid appointment or election, but where the officer has failed to conform to some precedent requirement or condition (e.g., taking an oath or giving a bond);

     * Under color of a known election or appointment, void because:

            a)the officer was not eligible;

            b)there was a want of power in the electing or appointing body;

            c)there was a defect or irregularity in its exercise;

such ineligibility, want of power, or defect being unknown to the public.

    * Under color of an election or an appointment by or pursuant to a public, unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be such.

           Note:  Here, what is unconstitutional is not the act creating the office, but the act by which the officer is appointed to an office legally existing.  (Norton v. County of Shelby)

Sources: Philippine Administrative Law and Law on Public Officers by: Ruben Agpalo

              Public Officers @ www.angelfire.com 

Malaluan vs. COMELEC

G.R. # 120193

FACTS:

Petitioner Malaluan and Private Respondent Evangelista were both Mayoralty candidates.  Private Respondent was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly elected Mayor against the Petitioner.

Petitioner filed an election protest with the RTC contesting 64 out of the total 181 precincts of the said Municipality.  The trial court declared Petitioner as the duly elected Municipal Mayor.

The Private Respondent appealed the Trial Court’s decision to the COMELEC, which declared Private Respondent to be the duly elected Municipal Mayor.

The COMELEC found Petitioner liable for attorney’s fee, actual expenses for Xerox copies, and unearned salary and other emoluments, en masse denominated as actual damages. 

Petitioner naturally contests that propriety and legality of this award upon private respondent on the ground that said damages have not been alleged and proved during trial.  COMELEC on the other hand, concluded in justifying that Private Respondent be awarded actual damages, and hold that since Petitioner was adjudged the winner in the elections only by the Trial Court, the Petitioner is deemed to have occupied the position in an illegal manner as a Usurper.

ISSUE:

W/N Petitioner acted as a Usurper?

HELD:

We hold that petitioner was not a usurper because, while a usurper is one who undertakes to act officially without any color of right, the petitioner exercised the duties of an elective office under color of election thereto. It matters not that it was the trial court and not the COMELEC that declared petitioner as the winner, because both, at different stages of the electoral process, have the power to so proclaim winners in electoral contests.

We deem petitioner, therefore, to be a “de facto officer who, in good faith, has had possession of the office and had discharged the duties pertaining thereto” and is thus “legally entitled to the emoluments of the office.”

Codilla vs. Martinez

DE FACTO OFFICER

 

FACTS:

Mayor of Tagum designated his Vice Mayor to act in his place for the reason that he needs to attend to his sick brother in Negros Occidental, the designation takes effect until further advice from the Mayor.  The Vice Mayor had lung trouble and so he designated his ranking Councilor, who also was not in good health and designated the third ranking Councilor Jose Martinez, herein respondent.

When Martinez accepted his designation, and assumed office, his first official act being to separate from the service the petitioners as policemen of the Municipality in compliance with Sec. 682 of the Revised Administrative Code which provided that the appointment of Petitioners are in a temporary capacity, because they are not Civil Service Eligibles and such appointments were valid only for three months.

The action of Acting Mayor Martinez was validated when the incumbent Mayor endorsed and ratified the same by his subsequent official actuation; and that, not being Civil Service Eligibles, petitioners may be separated from service upon the expiration of the term of three months.

ISSUE: 

 W/N Acting Mayor Martinez’ designation as Acting Mayor was valid and W/N his actuation was legal?

HELD:

Although his designation was irregular, still he was acting under a color of authority, as distinguished from a usurper who is "one who has neither title nor color of right of an office. . . The acts of Jose L. Martinez are therefore official acts of a de facto officer. If they are made within the scope of the authority vested by the law in the office of the mayor of Tagum, such acts of a de facto office are here present.

An officer de facto is to be distinguished from an officer de jure, and is one who has the reputation or appearance of being the officer he assumes to be but who, in fact, under the law, has no right or title to the office he assumes to hold. He is distinguished from a mere usurper or intruder by the fact that the former holds by some color of right or title while the latter intrudes upon the office and assumes to exercise its functions without either the legal title or color of right to such office.

To constitute a de facto officer, there must be an office having a de facto existence, or at least one recognized by law and the claimant must be in actual possession of the office under color of title or authority. 

Another factor that may be invoked in favor of the validity of the official actuation of Acting Mayor Martinez is the fact that all his official acts done under his designation were subsequently endorsed and ratified by the incumbent mayor when he returned to office. This ratification served to cure any legal infirmity the acts of Acting Mayor Martinez may have suffered because of his irregular designation.

ASTURIAS SUGAR CENTRAL, INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and CTA September 30, 1969CASTRO, J.

Facts:

Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. is engaged in the production and milling of centrifugal sugar, the sugar so produced being placed in containers known as jute bags.  In 1957, It made two importations of jute bags, free from customs duties and special import tax upon the Petitioner’s filing of re-exportation and special import tax bond, conditioned upon the exportation of the jute bags within one year from the date of importation. 

However, out of the 44,800 jute bags imported first, only 8,647 were exported and only 25,000 were exported out of the 75,200 jute bags imported on the second shipment. In other words, of the total number of imported jute bags only 33,647 bags were exported within one year after their importation. The remaining 86,353 bags were exported after the expiration of the one-year period but within three years from their importation.

Petitioner requested the Commissioner of Customs for a week's extension of Re-exportation and Special Import Tax Bond no. 6 which was to expire the following day, citing reasons for its failure to export the remaining jute bags within the period of one year.  However, this request was denied by the Commissioner.

Due to the petitioner's failure to show proof of the exportation of the balance of 86,353 jute bags within one year from their importation, the Petitioner was required to pay the amount of p28,629.42 representing the customs duties and special import tax due thereon, which the petitioner paid under protest and later on demanded the refund of the amount it had paid.

Issues:

a.) Whether or not the Commissioner of Customs is vested with discretion to extend the period of one year provided for in section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909.

b.) Whether or not interpretation or construction of an ambiguous or uncertain statute by the Executive Department or other Administrative Agencies be given consideration?  In the case at bar, the Bureau of Customs.

Held:

a.) Section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act Of 1909 and the superseding sec. 105(x) of the Tariff and Customs Code, while fixing at one year the period within which the containers therein mentioned must be exported, are silent as to whether the said period may be extended. By reason of this silence, the Bureau of Customs Issued Administrative Orders 389 and 66 to eliminate confusion and provide a guide as to how it shall apply the law, and, more specifically, to make officially known its policy to consider the one-year period mentioned in the law as non-extendible.

b.) Considering that the statutory provisions in question (Section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909 and Sec. 105(x) of the Tariff and Customs Code) have not been the subject of previous judicial interpretation, then the application of the doctrine of "judicial respect for administrative construction (in the case at bar the Bureau of Customs issued Administrative Orders 389 and 66 to eliminate confusion and provide a guide as to how it shall apply the law, and, more specifically, to make officially known its policy to consider the one-year period mentioned in the law as non-extendible., " would, initially, be in order.

          Only where the court of last resort has not previously interpreted the statute is the rule applicable that courts will give consideration to construction by administrative or executive departments of the state.

          The formal or informal interpretation or practical construction of an ambiguous or uncertain statute or law by the executive department or other agency charged with its administration or enforcement is entitled to consideration and the highest respect from the courts, and must be accorded appropriate weight in determining the meaning of the law, especially when the construction or interpretation is long continued and uniform or is contemporaneous with the first workings of the statute, or when the enactment of the statute was suggested by such agency.

          Considering that the Bureau of Customs is the office charged with implementing and enforcing the provisions of our Tariff and Customs Code, the construction placed by it thereon should be given controlling weight.

          In applying the doctrine or principle of respect for administrative or practical construction, the courts often refer to several factors which may be regarded as bases of the principle, as factors leading the courts to give the principle controlling weight in particular instances, or as independent rules in themselves. These factors are the respect due the governmental agencies charged with administration, their competence, expertness, experience, and informed judgment and the fact that they frequently are the drafters of the law they interpret; that the agency is the one on which the legislature must rely to advise it as to the practical working out of the statute, and practical application of the statute presents the agency with unique opportunity and experiences for discovering deficiencies, inaccuracies, or improvements in the statute.

Van Dorn v. Romillo

Facts:

Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and Richard Upton, a US Citizen, were married in 1979.  They established their residence in the Philippines and had two children.  In 1982, the parties were divorced in Nevada, USA and the petitioner was re-married to Theodore Van Dorn.  Private Respondent, Richard Upton filed suit against petitioner claiming that a business in Ermita, Manila, is a conjugal property of the parties, and that the latter should render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.

Issue:

Whether or not the foreign divorce in Nevada between the petitioner and private respondent is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen?

Held:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.  In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

Lawyering @ Century 21: Globalization, ICT and the Legal Profession

A Reaction by: Brenda Lyn Babao

We all live in a world of rational people. This rationality and intelligence paved the way to changes, changes from all around; changes in the way we live as a country, before and now. However, we should not limit ourselves to the changes within our locality and our country but also as we participate and interrelate ourselves with other countries, we should promote and welcome their developments and changes to become our own as well. The idea of competitiveness has escalated into a bigger and broader concept from the standpoint of an individual to himself, to his community, to his country, and to the world; that is becoming globally competitive.

Parallel to the advances in information and technology should also be developments in the legal profession. Apparently, there are a lot of issues concerning legal matters which we can’t further understand and perfectly deal with if we limit ourselves within the square box of the old school.

The legal profession is human service at the highest order. How can we serve our people better if we limit ourselves to simple traditional ways? The world is continually changing. In as much as a simple problem needs a simple solution, a complicated and complex issue should also be dealt accordingly with a complicated and well-designed formula. Excellent performance is excellent service.

I agree with Atty. Jose Victor V. Chan- Gonzaga. The practice of law should not be limited to appearances in the court during litigation only. Let me cut this line from his article. “The court liberally defined practice of law as an activity, in or out of court which requires the application of law, legal knowledge, training and experience”. Hence, we should liberalize the legal profession but in the most responsible way. While we allow legal transactions over the internet and the practice of law as any service rendered involving legal knowledge or skill to cope with the technological changes we have at present and we’ll deal with in the future, the true essence of legal service should not be waved. The fiduciary relationship between clients and lawyers should not be degraded into a mere contractual relationship.

We may change the perception of the practice of law to cope with technological changes in order to serve the common good, however, the true spirit of being ambassadors of justice and ambassadors of the law should never change with time. The concepts, the tactics, and the formula may change but the value of integrity in holding the profession should never be altered. We may promote technological changes to cope with technological advances that emerged out of globalization but the public, the court, and the client should remain adequately protected.

Let me quote Senior Associate Justice Josue. N. Bellosillo “We cannot afford to be left behind ensconced in our own private comfort zones and say that we will cross the bridge when we reach there. We do not always go where the path leads, we also go where there is no path and blaze a trail”.

Crossing the bridge of uncertainty is courage. It is personal growth. Building the bridge when there is none is service. Where there is no path and there is no bridge, let us make our mark and blaze the trail but never to forget the essentials of keeping the practice of law a hallowed profession and a commitment for human service.