Great Pacific Life vs. CA

 G.R. No. 113899, October 13, 1999

 

FACTS:

A contract of group life insurance was executed between petitioner Grepalife) and DBP. Grepalife agreed to insure the lives of eligible housing loan mortgagors of DBP.

Dr. Wilfredo Leuterio, a housing debtor of DBP applied for membership in the group life insurance plan. In an application form, Dr. Leuterio answered yes to the question asking if he is in good health.

Grepalife issued Certificate No. B-18558, as insurance coverage of Dr. Leuterio, to the extent of his DBP mortgage indebtedness amounting to eighty-six thousand, two hundred (P86,200.00) pesos.

Dr. Leuterio died due to "massive cerebral hemorrhage." Consequently, DBP submitted a death claim to Grepalife. Grepalife denied the claim alleging that Dr. Leuterio was not physically healthy when he applied for an insurance coverage. Grepalife insisted that Dr. Leuterio did not disclose he had been suffering from hypertension, which caused his death.

The trial court rendered a decision in favor of respondent widow and against Grepalife. On May 17, 1993, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court’s decision. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUES:

 

a.     W/N Grepalife is liable to DBP which is not a party to the case for payment of the proceeds of a mortgage redemption insurance?

b.    W/N Grepalife will pay to DPB the amount of P86,200.00 in the absence of any evidence to show how much was the actual amount payable to DBP in accordance with its group insurance contract with defendant-appellant? 

HELD:

a.     The rationale of a group insurance policy of mortgagors, otherwise known as the "mortgage redemption insurance," is a device for the protection of both the mortgagee and the mortgagor. On the part of the mortgagee, it has to enter into such form of contract so that in the event of the unexpected demise of the mortgagor during the subsistence of the mortgage contract, the proceeds from such insurance will be applied to the payment of the mortgage debt, thereby relieving the heirs of the mortgagor from paying the obligation.  In a similar vein, ample protection is given to the mortgagor under such a concept so that in the event of death; the mortgage obligation will be extinguished by the application of the insurance proceeds to the mortgage indebtedness. Consequently, where the mortgagor pays the insurance premium under the group insurance policy, making the loss payable to the mortgagee, the insurance is on the mortgagor’s interest, and the mortgagor continues to be a party to the contract. In this type of policy insurance, the mortgagee is simply an appointee of the insurance fund, such loss-payable clause does not make the mortgagee a party to the contract.

 

Section 8 of the Insurance Code provides: "Unless the policy provides, where a mortgagor of property effects insurance in his own name providing that the loss shall be payable to the mortgagee, or assigns a policy of insurance to a mortgagee, the insurance is deemed to be upon the interest of the mortgagor, who does not cease to be a party to the original contract, and any act of his, prior to the loss, which would otherwise avoid the insurance, will have the same effect, although the property is in the hands of the mortgagee, but any act which, under the contract of insurance, is to be performed by the mortgagor, may be performed by the mortgagee therein named, with the same effect as if it had been performed by the mortgagor."

 

The insured private respondent did not cede to the mortgagee all his rights or interests in the insurance, the policy stating that: "In the event of the debtor’s death before his indebtedness with the Creditor [DBP] shall have been fully paid, an amount to pay the outstanding indebtedness shall first be paid to the creditor and the balance of sum assured, if there is any, shall then be paid to the beneficiary/ies designated by the debtor." When DBP submitted the insurance claim against petitioner, the latter denied payment thereof, interposing the defense of concealment committed by the insured. Thereafter, DBP collected the debt from the mortgagor and took the necessary action of foreclosure on the residential lot of private Respondent.

 

b.    Petitioner’s claim is without merit. A life insurance policy is a valued policy. Unless the interest of a person insured is susceptible of exact pecuniary measurement, the measure of indemnity under a policy of insurance upon life or health is the sum fixed in the policy.  The mortgagor paid the premium according to the coverage of his insurance, which states that:  "The policy states that upon receipt of due proof of the Debtor’s death during the terms of this insurance, a death benefit in the amount of P86,200.00 shall be paid. 

     In the event of the debtor’s death before his indebtedness with the creditor shall have been fully paid, an amount to pay the outstanding indebtedness shall first be paid to the Creditor and the balance of the Sum Assured, if there is any shall then be paid to the beneficiary/ies designated by the debtor."   However, DBP foreclosed in 1995 their residential lot, in satisfaction of mortgagor’s outstanding loan. Considering this supervening event, the insurance proceeds shall inure to the benefit of the heirs of the deceased person or his beneficiaries. Equity dictates that DBP should not unjustly enrich itself at the expense of another (Nemo cum alterius detrimenio protest). Hence, it cannot collect the insurance proceeds, after it already foreclosed on the mortgage. The proceeds now rightly belong to Dr. Leuterio’s heirs represented by his widow, herein private respondent Medarda Leuterio.

UMALE vs. CANOGA PARK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION CASE DIGEST

GEORGE LEONARD S. UMALE, Petitioner, vs. CANOGA PARK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent. 

G.R. No. 167246, July 20,2011 

FACTS:

The respondent filed an unlawful detainer case against the petitioner even before the expiration of the lease contract, because of alleged violation of stipulations in the lease contract regarding the use of the property. It was alleged that under the lease contract, the petitioner shall use the leased lot as a parking space for light vehicles and as a site for a small drivers’ canteen, and may not utilize the subject premises for other purposes without the respondent’s prior written consent. 

The petitioner, however, constructed restaurant buildings and other commercial establishments on the lot, without first securing the required written consent from the respondent, and the necessary permits and also subleased the property to various merchants-tenants in violation of the lease contract.

The MTC decided the case in favor of the respondent which decision was affirmed by the RTC. The case however, was re-raffled to another branch of the RTC when the Presiding Judge inhibited himself from resolving the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. The RTC to which the case was this time assigned granted the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration thereby reversing and setting aside the MTC decision. Accordingly, the case was dismissed for being prematurely filed. Thus, the respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals.

During the pendency of the petition for review, the respondent filed another case for unlawful detainer against the petitioner. This time the respondent used as a ground for ejectment the expiration of the parties’ lease contract. Judgment was rendered in favor of the respondent.

On appeal, the RTC reversed and set aside the decision of the MTC on the ground of litis pendentia. In the CA, the respondent argued that there exists no litis pendentia between the parties because the two cases involved different grounds for ejectment. The first case was filed because of violations of the lease contract, while the second case was filed due to the expiration of the lease contract. The respondent emphasized that the second case was filed based on an event or a cause not yet in existence at the time of the filing of the first case. The CA agreed and ordered the reinstatement of the decision of the MTC. It ruled that there was no litis pendentia because the two civil cases have different causes of action.

A petition for review on certiorari filed by the petitioner.

ISSUE:

               W/N there was litis pendentia?

RULING:

 The Court ruled that there was no litis pendentia, thus: xxx “As a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, litis pendentia refers to a situation where two actions are pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious. Litis pendentia exists when the following requisites are present: identity of the parties in the two actions; substantial identity in the causes of action and in the reliefs sought by the parties; and the identity between the two actions should be such that any judgment that may be rendered in one case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.”

In resolving the issue the Court mentioned the three tests to ascertain whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of action. The court proceeds thus: “x x x Of the three tests cited, the third one is especially applicable to the present case, i.e., whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first complaint - and to which [th]e [Court] answer[ed] in the negative.

The facts clearly show that the filing of the first ejectment case was grounded on the petitioner’s violation of stipulations in the lease contract, while the filing of the second case was based on the expiration of the lease contract. At the time the respondent filed the first ejectment complaint xxx the lease contract between the parties was still in effect, x x x It was only at the expiration of the lease contract that the cause of action in the second ejectment complaint accrued and made available to the respondent as a ground for ejecting the petitioner.

Thus, the cause of action in the second case was not yet in existence at the time of filing of the first ejectment case. In response to the petitioner’s contention that the similarity xxx rests on the reiteration in the second case of the cause of action in the first case, [th]e [Court] rule[s] that the restatement does not result in substantial identity between the two cases. Even if the respondent alleged violations of the lease contract as a ground for ejectment in the second complaint, the main basis for ejecting the petitioner in the second case was the expiration of the lease contract. If not for this subsequent development, the respondent could no longer file a second complaint for unlawful detainer because an ejectment complaint may only be filed within one year after the accrual of the cause of action, which, in the second case, was the expiration of the lease contract.”

 

Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC Case Digest

 THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents. G.R. No. 205728 , January 21, 2015

FACTS: 

Petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message "IBASURA RH Law" referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case.  This tarpaulin contains the heading "Conscience Vote" and lists candidates as either "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay" with a check mark, or "(Pro-RH) Team Patay" with an "X" mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law.  Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising "Team Patay," while those who voted against it form "Team Buhay".

Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names of candidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.

Respondent issued a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials addressed to petitioner. The election officer ordered the tarpaulin’s removal within three (3) days from receipt for being oversized. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for the size requirement of two feet (2’) by three feet (3’).

Petitioners replied requesting, among others, that a definite ruling be given by COMELEC Law Department regarding the tarpaulin; and pending this opinion and the availment of legal remedies, the tarpaulin be allowed to remain.

COMELEC Law Department then issued a letter ordering the immediate removal of the tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be constrained to file an election offense against petitioners.

Petitioners filed a Petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was violation of the Doctrine of Judicial Heirarchy?

RULING:

There was none. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance.

The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. This court has "full discretionary power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction [over] special civil actions for certiorari . . .filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition." As correctly pointed out by petitioners, we have provided exceptions to this doctrine:

First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time. In this case, the assailed issuances of respondents prejudice not only petitioners’ right to freedom of expression in the present case, but also of others in future similar cases.

A second exception is when the issues involved are of transcendental importance. In these cases, the imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for prudence.  In the case before this court, there is a clear threat to the paramount right of freedom of speech and freedom of expression which warrants invocation of relief from this court.

Third, cases of first impression warrant a direct resort to this court. In cases of first impression, no jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts on this matter.

Fourth, the constitutional issues raise dare better decided by this court. In this case, it is this court, with its constitutionally enshrined judicial power, that can rule with finality on whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion or performed acts contrary to the Constitution through the assailed issuances.

Fifth, the time element presented in this case cannot be ignored. This case was filed during the 2013 election period. Although the elections have already been concluded, future cases may be filed that necessitate urgency in its resolution. Exigency in certain situations would qualify as an exception for direct resort to this court.

Sixth, the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ. COMELEC is a constitutional body. In Albano v. Arranz, cited by petitioners, this court held that "[i]t is easy to realize the chaos that would ensue if the Court of First Instance of each and every province were [to] arrogate itself the power to disregard, suspend, or contradict any order of the Commission on Elections: that constitutional body would be speedily reduced to impotence."

In this case, if petitioners sought to annul the actions of COMELEC through pursuing remedies with the lower courts, any ruling on their part would not have been binding for other citizens whom respondents may place in the same situation. Besides, this court affords great respect to the Constitution and the powers and duties imposed upon COMELEC. Hence, a ruling by this court would be in the best interest of respondents, in order that their actions may be guided accordingly in the future.

Seventh, petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that could free them from the injurious effects of respondents’ acts in violation of their right to freedom of expression.

Eighth, the petition includes questions that are "dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy."

It is not, however, necessary that all of these exceptions must occur at the same time to justify a direct resort to this court. ***While generally, the hierarchy of courts is respected, the present case falls under the recognized exceptions and, as such, may be resolved by this court directly.

MOOT AND ACADEMIC PRINCIPLE

 A case is said to be moot and/or academic when it "ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value."32 Thus, the courts "generally decline jurisdiction over the case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness."33

The "mootness" principle, however, does accept certain exceptions and the mere raising of an issue of "mootness" will not deter the courts from trying a case when there is a valid reason to do so. In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo (David), the Court provided four instances where courts can decide an otherwise moot case, thus: GECC

1.) There is a grave violation of the Constitution;

2.) The exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest is involved;

3.) When constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and

4.) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

(Narra Nickel vs. Redmont, G.R. No. 195580, April 21, 2014)

Pardon versus Amnesty, Distinction

Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice.

Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction.

Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolished or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does "not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon," and it "in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence" article 36, Revised Penal Code). while amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.

Barrioquinto vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-1278, January 21, 1949

Plea Bargaining

What is plea bargaining?

Plea bargaining is defined  as “a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge” (Daan vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 163972-77; March 28, 2008).

Plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings and is authorized under the Rules of Court, Sec. Rule 116.

Plea Bargaining in Drug Cases:

Sec. 23 of RA 9165 which prohibited plea bargaining in drug cases was considered unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the case of Salvador Estipona, Jr. Vs. Lobrigo.

Estipona vs. Lobriga Case Digest

SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner, vs. HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

G.R. No. 226679

August 15, 2017

 

FACTS:

Petitioner is the accused for the crime of Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165, possession of dangerous drugs.  

He filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession.

In this petition, the constitutionality of Sec. 23, of R.A. 9165 prohibiting plea-bargaining, was being challenged.

 

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sec. 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it violates the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court?

 

RULING:

Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is declared unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.  

This Court asserted its discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of government. To reiterate, the Court's authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the safeguards of Our institutional independence.

While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this Court. Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads: Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

x x x x

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

Can An Adult Be Adopted?

Yes, an adult can be adopted provided that prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently considered and treated by the adopter as his/her own child since minority, provided further that adoptee, the children of the adopter, and the spouse of the adoptee, if any, give their consent to the adoption, as provided for in Sec. 8 and 9 of the Domestic Adoption Act.  

DOMESTIC ADOPTION ACT, RA 8552:

Section 8. Who May Be Adopted. – The following may be adopted:

(a) Any person below eighteen (18) years of age who has been administratively or judicially declared available for adoption;

(b) The legitimate son/daughter of one spouse by the other spouse;

(c) An illegitimate son/daughter by a qualified adopter to improve his/her status to that of legitimacy;

(d) A person of legal age if, prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently considered and treated by the adopter(s) as his/her own child since minority; ***Can a 22-yr.old person be adopted?

(e) A child whose adoption has been previously rescinded; or

(f) A child whose biological or adoptive parent(s) has died: Provided, That no proceedings shall be initiated within six (6) months from the time of death of said parent(s).

Section 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. – After being properly counseled and informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby required:

(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;

(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality which has legal custody of the child;

(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;

(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter if living with said adopter and the latter's spouse, if any; and

(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.

Prejudicial Question

A prejudicial question is defined to be that which arises in a case, the resolution of which question is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. 

ELEMENTS of a PREJUDICIAL QUESTION:

(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and

(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

REQUISITES of a PREJUDICIAL QUESTION:

The following requisites must be present for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case: 

(1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; 

(2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and 

(3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.

Prejudicial question has been defined to be that which arises in a case, the resolution of which question is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court; that is its first element. Jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal; this is the second element. 

In an action for bigamy for example, if the accused claims that the first marriage is null and void and the right to decide such validity is vested in another tribunal, the civil action for nullity must first be decided before the action for bigamy can proceed; hence, the validity of the first marriage is a prejudicial question. (People v. Aragon, 50 Off. Gaz. No. 10, 4863).

Imbong v.COMELEC Case Digest

G.R. No. L-32432; G.R. No. L-32443; 25 SCRA 28 September 11, 1970

FACTS:

Petitioners Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales, both interested in running as candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention, filed separate but related petitions questioning the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming that it prejudices their rights as such candidates. 

On March 16, 1967, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution, passed Resolution No. 2 which among others called for a Constitutional Convention to propose constitutional amendments to be composed of two delegates from each representative district who shall have the same qualifications as those of Congressmen.  

On June 17, 1969, Congress, also acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 4 amending the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 of March 16, 1967 by providing that the convention "shall be composed of 320 delegates apportioned among the existing representative districts according to the number of their respective inhabitants: Provided, that a representative district shall be entitled to at least two delegates, who shall have the same qualifications as those required of members of the House of Representatives."

Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales assails the validity of the entire law as well as the particular provisions embodied in Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a). Petitioner Manuel B. Imbong impugns the constitutionality of only par. I of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. No. 6132 practically on the same grounds advanced by petitioner Gonzales.

ISSUES:

1. W/N Sections 2, 4, 5 and par. 1 of 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 are valid provisions?

2. W/N the Congress has the authority to call for a constitutional convention?

3. W/N it has the power to enact the implementing rules while acting as legislative body?

HELD:

1. Sections 2, 4, 5 and par. 1 of 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 are valid provisions.

   a.) Sec. 2 on the apportionment of delegates: 

Unlike in the apportionment of representative districts, the Constitution does not expressly or impliedly require such apportionment of delegates to the convention on the basis of population in each congressional district. Congress, sitting as a Constituent Assembly, may constitutionally allocate one delegate for, each congressional district or for each province, for reasons of economy and to avoid having an unwieldy convention. 

   b.) The validity of Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6132: 

The validity of Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6132, which considers, all public officers and employees, whether elective or appointive, including members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as well as officers and employees of corporations or enterprises of the government, as resigned from the date of the filing of their certificates of candidacy, was recently sustained by this Court, on the grounds, inter alia, that the same is merely an application of and in consonance with the prohibition in Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution and that it does not constitute a denial of due process or of the equal protection of the law. 

  c.) Sec. 5 of R.A. 6132 is a valid provision:  

The challenged disqualification prescribed in Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 6132 is a valid limitation on the right to public office pursuant to state police power as it is reasonable and not arbitrary.

The discrimination under Sec. 5 against delegates to the Constitutional Convention is likewise constitutional; for it is based on a substantial distinction which makes for real differences, is germane to the purposes of the law, and applies to all members of the same class.

  d) Paragraph 1, Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is not violative of the constitutional guarantees of due process, equal protection of the laws, freedom of expressions, freedom of assembly and freedom of association.

It is therefore patent that the restriction contained in Sec. 8(a) is so narrow that the basic constitutional rights themselves remain substantially intact and inviolate. And it is therefore a valid infringement of the aforesaid constitutional guarantees invoked by petitioners.

2.  Yes. Congress, when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution, has full and plenary authority to propose Constitutional amendments or to call a convention for the purpose, by a three-fourths vote of each House in joint session assembled but voting separately.

3. Yes. Implementing details are matters within the competence of Congress in the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power, which power encompasses all matters not expressly or by necessary implication withdrawn or removed by the Constitution from the ambit of legislative action. And as lone as such statutory details do not clash with any specific provision of the constitution, they are valid.

RESOLUTION: 

WHEREFORE, the prayers in both petitions are hereby denied and R.A. No. 6132 including Secs. 2, 4, 5, and 8(a), paragraph 1, thereof, cannot be declared unconstitutional.

De Lima et.al vs. Gatdula Case Digest

G.R. No. 204528
Feb. 19, 2013
En Banc


FACTS:
Respondent Gatdula filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo in the RTC of Manila, directed against petitioners.

Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo or not, the judge issued summons and ordered the petitioners to file an answer.  He also set the case for hearing.

The counsel for petitioners manifested that a Return and not an Answer is appropriate for Amparo cases but the Judge opined that the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure applied since an Amparo case is summary in nature, thus, required an Answer.

The hearing was conducted and the judge ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda.

RTC then rendered a decision granting the issuance of the Writ of Amparo and interim reliefs prayed for namely: Temporary protection, production and inspection orders.

The decision was assailed by the petitioners through a Petition for Review on Certiorari via Rule 45 as enunciated in Sec. 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of an Answer was appropriate?
2. Whether or not the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure apply in a Petition for Writ of Amparo?
3. Whether or not the holding of the hearing on the main case was proper?
4. Whether or not the filing of the memorandum was proper?
5. Whether or not the decision granting the privilege of the Writ and the interim reliefs was correct?
6. Whether or not the mode of appeal under Rule 45 availed by the Petitioners was correct?

RULING:
1. No. It is the Return that serves as the responsive pleading for petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo.

2. The Revised Rules of Summary Procedures apply only to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling how this rule could possibly apply to proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the application of summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a special proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or particular fact.34 It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is seriously misplaced.

3. No. The holding of the hearing without the Return was not proper. There will be a summary hearing only after the Return is filed to determine the merits of the petition and whether interim reliefs are warranted. If the Return is not filed, the hearing will be done ex parte.

4. No. A memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

5. No. The decision was not correct.  This gives the impression that the decision was the judgment since the phraseology is similar to Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo:

"SEC. 18. Judgment. — The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied." (Emphasis supplied).

The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the actual order called the Writ of Amparo. The privilege includes availment of the entire procedure outlined in the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. The judgment should detail the required acts from the respondents that will mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the petitioner's life, liberty or security.

A judgment which simply grants "the privilege of the writ" cannot be executed.

6. The Petition for Review is not the proper remedy to assail the interlocutory order. A Petition for Certiorari, on the other hand, is prohibited. Simply dismissing the present petition, however, will cause grave injustice to the parties involved. It undermines the salutary purposes for which the Rule on the Writ of Amparo were promulgated.

HELD:
(1) NULLIFY all orders issued by the Judge in relation to this Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo case;

(2) DIRECT the Judge to determine within forty-eight (48) hours from his receipt of this Resolution whether the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is proper on the basis of the petition and its attached affidavits.

Penned by: Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen

Gonzales vs. Abaya

G.R. No. 164007 August 10, 2006

FACTS:

President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo received intelligence reports that some members of the AFP had abandoned their designated places of assignment with the aim to destabilize the government. She then directed the AFP and the PNP to track and arrest them.

A total of 321 soldiers, including petitioners herein, surrendered to the authorities. President Arroyo issued a proclamation declaring a state of rebellion, followed by a General Order directing the AFP and PNP to take all necessary measures to suppress the rebellion.

In order to avoid a bloody confrontation, negotiations with the soldiers were made which resulted to the soldiers' return to their barracks.

The NBI investigated the incident and recommended that the military personnel involved be charged with coup d’etat defined and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Hence, the Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ) recommended the filing of the corresponding Information against them.

Meanwhile, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, respondent AFP Chief of Staff, ordered the arrest and detention of the soldiers involved in the Oakwood incident and directed the AFP to conduct its own separate investigation.

The DOJ filed with the RTC, Makati City an Information for coup d’etat against those soldiers.

Respondent Chief of Staff issued an order creating a Pre-Trial Investigation Panel tasked to determine the propriety of filing with the military tribunal charges for violations of Commonwealth Act No. 408, 4 (otherwise known as "The Articles of War"), as amended, against the same military personnel. 

Of the original 321 accused only 243 (including petitioners herein) filed with the RTC an Omnibus Motion praying that the said trial court assume jurisdiction over all the charges filed with the military tribunal. They invoked Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7055. 

Subsequently, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Final Pre-Trial Investigation Report to the JAGO, recommending that, following the "doctrine of absorption," those charged with coup d'etat before the RTC should not be charged before the military tribunal for violation of the Articles of War. 

For its part, the RTC issued an Order stating that "all charges before the court martial against the accused . . . are hereby declared not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d'etat." The trial court then proceeded to hear petitioners' applications for bail. 

The officer-in-charge of the JAGO, reviewed the findings of the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel. He recommended that 29 of the officers involved in the Oakwood incident, including petitioners, be prosecuted before a general court martial for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War. The same was approved by the AFP. 

The AFP Judge Advocate General then directed petitioners to submit their answer to the charge. Instead of complying, they filed with this Court the instant Petition for Prohibition praying that respondents be ordered to desist from charging them with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War in relation to the Oakwood incident. 

Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a determination that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is not service-connected, but is absorbed in the crime of coup d'etat, the military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its jurisdiction. 

ISSUE: 

1.Whether or not the court martial may assume jurisdiction over those who have been criminally charged of coup d’état before the regular courts?

2. Whether or not the doctrine of absorption of crimes is applicable?

HELD: 

1. Yes. Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected. This is expressly provided in Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the "service-connected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same — dismissal from the service — imposable only by the military court. Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military discipline. 

Hence, there is no merit in petitioners argument that they can no longer be charged before the court martial for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War because the same has been declared by the RTC in its Order of February 11, 2004 as "not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d'etat," hence, triable by said court (RTC). The RTC, in making such declaration, practically amended the law which expressly vests in the court martial the jurisdiction over "service-connected crimes or offenses." What the law has conferred the court should not take away. It is only the Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction on the court, tribunal, body or officer over the subject matter or nature of an action which can do so. And it is only through a constitutional amendment or legislative enactment that such act can be done. The first and fundamental duty of the courts is merely to apply the law "as they find it, not as they like it to be. Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void. 

2. No. The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that the charge of Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman is absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged crime of coup d'etat. Firstly, the doctrine of ‘absorption of crimes' is peculiar to criminal law and generally applies to crimes punished by the same statute, unlike here where different statutes are involved. Secondly, the doctrine applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not applicable to this case.

Yao Kee vs. Sy-Gonzales

Case Digest

G.R. No. L-55960 

November 24, 1988

Facts:

Sy Kiat, a Chinese national died in Caloocan City where he was then residing, leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth P300,000.00 more or less.

Thereafter, respondents filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration and appointment as administratrix one of the respondents.

The petition was opposed by the petitioners alleging that: (a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married in China; (b) the other oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased with Yao Kee; and, (c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is competent, willing and desirous to become the administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat.

The lower court ruled that Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat and the other oppositors are the legitimate children.  The eldest was appointed as the administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat.

However, Court of Appeals modified the decision and rendered that the legality of the marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee had not been proven to be valid to the laws of China.

Issue:

Whether or not oral testimonies, such as those presented by the petitioners are sufficient to establish validity of foreign marriage?

Ruling:

To establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence.  Without proofs of said requisites, the foreign marriage cannot be recognized in this country.

In this case the petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies presented cannot be considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only because they are self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.

Garcia vs. Recio

Case Digest
G.R. No. 138322

Facts:

Respondent, a Filipino, was married to an Australian citizen. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. Two years later, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.

Sometime later respondent became an Australian citizen and married Petitioner -- a Filipina in Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino.

Petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.  Petitioner then filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her. She claimed that she learned of respondent’s prior marriage to an Australian citizen only at a later time.

Respondent averred that, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution.  He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner.

About five years after the couple’s wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending -- respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia.

Issue:

Whether or not the divorce decree obtained abroad may be ipso facto admitted as evidence in Philippine courts?

Ruling:

No. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

GRANGER ASSOCIATES vs. MICROWAVE SYSTEMS, INC.

G.R. No. 79986

September 14, 1990

Foreign Corporation doing business in the Philippines

FACTS:

Granger Associates is a foreign corporation which was organized in the United States and has no license to do business in this country.   Microwave Systems, Inc., is a domestic corporation which has been sued for recovery of a sum equivalent to US$900,633.30 allegedly due from it to the petitioner.

The claim arose from a series of agreements concluded between the two parties, giving MSI the license to manufacture and sell its products in the Philippines and extended to the latter certain loans, equipment and parts.  Payment of these contracts not having been made as agreed upon, Granger filed a complaint against MSI and the other private respondents in the Regional Trial Court.

MSI alleged the affirmative defense that the plaintiff had no capacity to sue, being an unlicensed foreign corporation, and moved to dismiss.

Motion to dismiss was granted by RTC which was affirmed by the CA.

In this petition, Granger seeks the reversal of the respondent court on the ground that MSI has failed to prove its affirmative allegation that Granger was transacting business in the Philippines. It insists that it has dealt only with MSI and not the general public and contends that dealing with the public itself is an indispensable ingredient of transacting business. It also argues that its agreements with MSI covered only one isolated transaction for which it did not have to secure a license to be able to file its complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Granger Associates was doing business in the Philippines?

RULING:

YES.  It can be shown that the parties entered into a series of agreements, as in successive sales of the foreign company's regular products, that company shall be deemed as doing business in the Philippines.

The quoted stipulations show that Granger had extended its personality in the Philippines and would receive orders for its products and discharge its warranty obligations through the agency of MSI It would even appear that Granger intended to transact business in the Philippines through the instrumentality of MSI not only for the sale and warranty of its products in this country.

There is also a showing that the investment of Granger in MSI is quite substantial, enabling it to participate in the actual management and control of MSI In fact, it appointed a representative in the board of directors to protect its interests, and this director was so influential that, at his request, the regular board meeting was converted into an annual stockholder's meeting to take advantage of his presence. 

We are convinced from an examination of the terms and conditions of the contracts and agreements entered into between petitioner and private respondents indicate that they established within our country a continuous business, and not merely one of a temporary character. Such agreements did not constitute only one isolated transaction, as the petitioner contends, but a succession of acts signifying the intent of Granger to extend its operations in the Philippines.

The purpose of the rule requiring foreign corporations to secure a license to do business in the Philippines is to enable us to exercise jurisdiction over them for the regulation of their activities in this country, If a foreign corporation operates in the Philippines without submitting to our laws, it is only just that it not be allowed to invoke them in our courts when it should need them later for its own protection. While foreign investors are always welcome in this land to collaborate with us for our mutual benefit, they must be prepared as an indispensable condition to respect and be bound by Philippine law in proper cases, as in the one at bar.